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ABSTRACT

The paper presents a theoreti cal and empirica l survey of three canmon
concerns about ptblic sector debt and deficits . The first is based on the view
that sooner or later, public sector deficits nust be monetized and will
therefor e lead to inflatio n.

The secorrl concerns the possibi lity of explosiv e

debt-de ficit spirals arrl ultimate ly default or repudiat ion of the public debt.
The third relates to "financi al crowding out," the decline in interest -sensiti ve
or real exchange rate-sen sitive private and foreign spending resultin g from the
st:bstitu tion of borrowing for current taxes. The final section updates the nCM

12-year old lanent of Blinder and Solow about the misuse of various "model-free"
neasures of fiscal stance.

Willen H. BUiter, rrA Guide to Public Sector Debt and Deficits "

A GUIDE TO PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT AND DEFICITS*
Introduction

1./

Public sector deficits and the burden of the public debt are once
again at the centre of macroeconomic policy debate.

In Britain the

rhetoric and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the reality of the Medium-Term
Financial Strategy (MTFS) adopted and pursued since 1980, emphasized the
primacy of fiscal orthodoxy and sound money, the former being viewed as a
precondition for the latter.

In continental Europe, countries as diverse

as the German Federal Republic, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Belgiuti ha'\Te felt cpmpelled to make t:he control and t'ednction of public
sector financial deficits a ( o.ften the) corner.stone of macroeconomic
policy design, overriding traditional concerns with the use of fiscal
policy and budgetary deficits as cycl.ica1 stabilization devices.

In the

United States; widespread professional concern about steadily growing
structural federal deficits is now beginning to be share4 by the admini- ·
Stration and a major political battle to contain and cut back the deficit
through spendin:g cuts and/or tax increases is under way.
The concern about public ,sector cie-bt and deficits is most easily
understood when one first considers the extremely rarified set of condi
tions under which the magnitude of public sector debt and deficits would
be irrelevant.

Right away, it should be emphasized that "debt neutrality"

or non-neutrality refers to the absence or presence of real effects
from alternative ways of financing a given program of spending on real
goods and services (or "exhaustive" spending program).

Changes in the

amount and/or composition of the real exhaustive spending program will

*The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in
Financial Markets and Monetary Economics. Any opinions expressed are
those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic
Research
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(almost) always have real effects.

The only exceptio n would be when

public consump tion or investme nt is a perfect substitu te for private
consump tion or investme nt (see Buiter [1977]).

In what follows the

principa l focus of attentio n are the conseque nces of substitu ting bond
financin g (or borrowin g) for tax financin g of a given real exhausti ve
spending program.

The scope for and conseque nces of money financin g are

also consider ed in some detail.

"Debt neutrali ty" will preV'ail when:

ent;
(a) private agents can lend and borrow on the same terms as the governm
(b) private agents are a.ble and willing to undo any governm ent scheme to

redistri bute real income between successi ve generati ons by making offset
ting voluntar y intergen erationa l transfer s (beques ts or gifts to the
younger generati on); and (e) there are no distorti onary tues, transfer s

or subsidie s, i.e., all taxes, transfer s, and subsidie s are "lump-sum"
(Bttrrot [1974]).
For (b) to hold, private agents either must live forever or achieve
the economic equivale nt of eternal life by being endowed with operativ e
intergen erationa l gift and bequest motives.

Retired parents must, e.g.;

be willing and able to return, through increase d bequests to their working
children , the income the governm ent is redistri buting from the children to
the parents by means of national insuranc e contribu tions by the children
that are used to finance the parents' pensions .

In reality, private

decision horizons are finite and frequen tly quite short both because
of the nature of private tastes and objectiv es and because of binding
constrai nts encounte red in a variety of financia l and capital markets.
As

regards the former, not everybod y is a bearer of intergen erationa l
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goodwil l.

Even among those who love their parents and children , the

probabi lity of childles sness in the current and future generati ons will
raise the effectiv e intergen erationa l discount rate applied by house
holds.

As

regards the latter, capital market imperfec tions are an

importan t restrain t on the ability of househol ds (and many private firms)
to make intertem poral transfer s of resource s.

Credit rationin g, liquidit y

constra ints, large spreads between borrowin g and lending rates, and public
sector borrowin g rates that are signific antly below private borrowin g
rates are an establis hed empiric al fact in most industri alized countrie s.
There also exists a rich and varied theoreti cal literatu re which can
explain s:uch capital market imperfec tions and the often associat ed non
Walrasia n equilib ria in ways that do not imply the wholesa le abandonment
of cherishe d notions of rationa lity •. The new and burgeoni ng literatu re
on asytlml.etric informa tion and the implicat ions of moral hazard and adverse
selectio n for equilibr ium behavior in private financia l markets is espe
cially illumina ting in this regard. 2/ Even if there were no uncertai nty
about the exogenou s enviro!lm ent Qr the charact eristics of other economic
agents, abandon ing the assumpti on of price-ta king or passive competi tive
behaviou r by one of game-th eoretic or active competi tive behaviou r may
be sufficie nt to yield (ineffic ient) credit rationin g as an equilibr ium
outcome in a wide range of plausibl e market settings .

1/

Even if private agents have operativ e intergen erationa l gift and
bequest motives and face perfect capital markets, the non-lump sum,
distorti onary nature of taxes, transfer s, and subsidie s may lead to non
neutral ity o.f the substitu tion of borrowin g for current taxation .

Such

- 4 -

"second order" non-neutralitie s (Barro [ 1979]) can, under certain .restric
tive assumptions, lead to a prescription of tax "smoothing" or constant
(expected) tax rates over time.

Temporary deficits or surpluses would in

general be associated with the pursuit of policies that minimize the
excess burden, efficiency loss, or collection costs of the tax system.
Absent debt neutrality, alternative modes of financing a given
programme of "exhaustive" public spending will have real consequences in
the· short run and in the long run.

In the short run, the substitution of

borrowiag for taxation increases ex-ante private consU1J1.ption and reduces
private investment.!:,./

(Under debt neutrality, an increase in the public

sector financial deficit due to a tax cut would induce a matching increase
in private saving.)

In the long run, the reduction in private investment

lowers the path of the capital-labour and capital-output ratios.

In an

open economy, bond-financed tax cuts are likely to lead to a deterioration
of the current account in the. short run and to an increase in the external
debt burden in the long run.

These are the familiar short run and long

run "crowding out" consequences of public sector deficits.

Together with

some less familiar forms of financial crowding out they are surveyed in
Section 5.

Whether or to what extent a tax cut and the associated ex-

ante increase in private consumption imply an ex-post reduction in total
domestic (private and public) saving depends on the "regime" under which
the economic system operates.

If output is demand-constrai ned, the tax

cut will, by boosting consumption demand, raise output and employment
through the familiar Keynesian demand multiplier mechanism.

Total domestic
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saving need fall only a little.

If real wage rigidity, real resource

bottlenecks or other "classical" constraints are binding, the ex-ante
and ex-post stories are the satne and "crowding out" is inevitable.
Besides crowding out fears, there are two other reasons why public
sector deficits have a bad reputation.

The first is based on the view

that sooner or later, public sector deficits must be monetised and will
therefore lead to inflation.

This proposition is analysed in Section 3.

The second fear relates to the doomsday scenario which envisages the
possibility of explosive debt-deficit spirals and ultimately repudiation
of the public debt.
in Section 4.

The threat of bankruptcy of the Exchequer is analysed

The last section of the paper, Section 6, draws conclusions

from the preceding sections concerning the meaning and relevance of
various measures o~ fiscal stance that have been proposed.

-

2.
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Public Sector Debt and Deficits in the United
Kingdom: Some Statistical Facts
The main facts about the behaviour of the public sector deficit and

debt in the United Kingdom are given in Figures 1 to 4 and in Tables 1
to 4 below.

Figures 1 and 2 display very long-time series for the debt-GDP

ratio and the debt service-GDP ratio respectively.

Figure 1 brings out

the familiar fact that gove.rnments incur most of their debt during or
immediately following major wars and use peacetime conditions to reduce
the debt-output ratio.

The data since 1801 show that the period following

the Napoleonic Wars saw the all---time peak of the debt-GDP ratio at 2.88 in
1821.

From there on until the beginning of the First World War, the debt

GDP ratio declined with only slight interruptions, reaching an all-time
low of 0.29 in 1914.

This reduction in the debt-output ratio between

1820 and 1914 was brought about partly by debt-retirement (from a peak
value of i844.3 million in 1819 to a low of £620.2 million in 1912).
A remarkable feature of this period is, however, that this decline in the
debt-GDP ratio was accompanied by a steady, if gentle, decline in the
general price level.

It was real output growth rather than "amortisation"

through inflation that accounted for the bulk of the reduction in the
debt-GDP ratio during the century before World War I.

After World War I

the debt-GDP ratio reached a "local" peak of 2.09 in 1924.

It then

declined steadily through the stagnation of the late twenties and the
onset of the Great Depression until it had reached 1.79 in 1930.

From

1931 it increased to 2.07 in 1934 after which it fell again until 1940.
The Second World War and its aftermath brought a new local peak of 2.72
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FIGURE 1
U.K. national debt-GDP ratio 180/ -1983
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National debt:

B,R. Mitchell and P. Deane, 196: Abstract of British
Historical Statistics, Cambridge Vniversity Press;
B.R. Mitchell and H.G. Jones (1971), Second Abstract
of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge University
Press; Annual Abstract of Statistics and Financial
Statistics, various issues.

GDP:

1801~51: Mitchell and Deane (1962), p.366.
1855-83: Mitchell and Dean (1962), p.367 and
Economic Trends, various issues.
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FIGL"RE 2

U.K. debt servi ce-G DP ratio

1801-1983

,..,

12.0

8.0
6.0

2.0
..,.__ ___~..................._ ___ ___ ___
L... --i-- ---.i .-................._ ......_ ~......--'- _....
U8l
1961
1921
1301
1881
1961
181+1
1821
1891
1971
1951
1911
1891
1871
1851
1831
1811

o.o

Note :

Income from Mitc hell
Pre-1 861 estim ate of GDP is Tota l Gross Nati onal
ain rath er than the
Brit
t
Grea
and Deane (196 2), p.366 . It appl ies to
likel y to unde rstat e
fore
there
is
U.K.- and omit s vario us serv ices. It
likel y to be somewhat
GDP. The debt -serv ice GDP ratio is cons eque ntly
.
biase d upwards befo re 1861

-

in 1947.
0.48.

9 -

The ratio then declined steadily until 1975 when it reached

Since the mid-seventi es it has remained roughly stationary around

o. so.
Figure 2 shows that the behaviour of the debt-service -GDP ratio for
the United Kingdom parallelled that of the debt-GDP ratio from 1821 until
1941.

The local peak reached in 1947 was, however, below that of the

second half of the 20s.

Debt service declined by less than 2 percentage

points of GDP between 1947 and 1973 after which it rose again to its
1946--47 level of 6 percent of GDP in 1981 with a small decline since then.
The stability of the debt-service ratio between 1951 and 1971 relative
to the decline in the debt ratio is accounted for in large measure by
the increase in the nominal interest rates over the period.

Real interest

rates were negative for much of the 60s and 70s.
A comparison of the U.K.'s debt-GDP ratio and of its public debt
service-GDP ratio with that of the other OECD countries is given in
Table 1 and Figure 3.
It shows that, as regards thedebt...,.GDP ratio of the general government
(Federal, State and Local), the United Kingdom in 1970 (with 86.2 percent)
was well above the average for the major seven OECD countries (39.6 per
cent) and the average for the OECD as a whole.

By 1983, the u.K. ratio,

at 54.2 percent, was in line with the major seven countries average
(50.8 percent) and the OECD average of 50.7 percent.

The United Kingdom

was the only major industrial country to achieve a significant reduction
in its debt-GDP ratio between 1970 and 1983.

Japan, Germany, and Italy
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1

Debt service burden on the general governmen t sector
(as percentag e of nominal GNP/GDP)

Debt interest payments

Debt outstandi ng

United States

C

1983

19i0

1983

1970

1975

1980

46.2

45.8

2.2
(1. 2)

2.5
(1-2)

3.3
(1.3)

4.6
(2.1)

I

- Cs!... a

i

;

-.

C
;

;..

'·

(2. ~)

Japan

12.0

. 66. 8d

0.6

1.2

3.2

4.~

~

Ge.p:nany

18.4

1.0

1.4

1.9

3.0

3.0

:ranee

29.4

41.1
32.6d

1.1

1.3

1.6

2.6

3.0

United Kingdom

86.2

54.2d

3.9

4.0

5.6

4.9

4.i

Italy

44.4

1.7

4.0

6.3

9.1

9.6

Canada

5.3.7

84.5
55. 5d

3.8

4.0

5.6

7.2

7.6

39.6

50.8

1.9

2.3

3.4

4.6

.!.i .9

Australia

41. 7

24.8d

2.5

2.1

3.2

4.0

...'· _,

Austria

19.4

44.Sd

l.0

1.3

2.5

3.1

3.3

Belgium

73.3

115 .6d

3.4

3.5

6.1

9.S

9.5

Der~rk

11.3

1.4

1.2

3.9

8.1

9.5

Finland

15.5

63.0
19.4d

1.0

o. i

1.0

1

- . :::,-

Greece

21.3

Netherlan ds

Tot.al major seven countries

e

(

LO

1.4

2.4

2.9

51.4

41. 9
61.4d

l.i
2 .Q

2.9

3.9

3.7

5.7

6.2

Norway

48.4

44.6d

1.8

2.1

3.. 9

3.9

3.8

Spain

14.4

31.3

0.6

0.5

0.8

1.3

.,

s~edeo

30.7

66.9d

1. 9

2.2

4.2

7.7

7.i

34.8

49.6

l. 9

2.0

3.1

4.6

5.0

38.9

50.i

1.9

2.3

3.4

4.6

4.9

Total smaller countries

e

Total of above countries

Source:

Notes:

e

O.E.C.D. Economic Outlook, December 1984.
a.
b.
c.

OECD Forecasts
OECD projectio ns b~sed on.the mechanica l assumptio ns indicated in
footnote in the text.
Fi21.1res in brackets corresoon d to net interest payments.

;

--~,
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'F iGl.\~E 3
HISTO RICAL PUBLIC DEBT/ GNP RATIOS FOR FIVE
MAJO R OECD COUNTRIES 111
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saw large increases while the United States was about constant over that
period (but rising rapidly, and even explosively towards the end of the
period).

All major industrial countries saw a rise in the debt-service

ratio between 1970 and 1984.

The increase was monotonic for all but the

United Kingdom whose debt-service ratio peaked (at 5.6 percent) in 1980
and has since fallen to 4.7 percent, slightly below the major country
and overall OECD average of 4.9 percent.
In table 2, I present a decomposition of the change in the U. K. debt
output ratio since 1948 into three parts:

the part "due to" the public

sector deficit; the part "due to" inflation; and the part "due to" real
output growth.
exercise.

Note that this is a purely arithmetic, ex-post accounting

Letting L denote the nominal value of the public debt, p the

general price level, and .Y real output, it follows that:

A(~y)
change in
debt-GDP
ratio

C<

-

.61.
pY

deficit as
"' a fraction
of GDP

-

APL
ppY

--

erosion of the
debt-GDP ratio
due to inflation

erosion of the debtGDP ratio due to real
output growth

AY L
y pY

-

From Table 2 ( where column 2 corresponds to A(~y), column 3 to :;,
column 4 to - ~
pL
pY' and column 5 to -AYL
YpY), we see that the total
change in the debt-GDP ratio between 1948 and 1984 of -1.944 can be almost
exactly accounted for by the effect of inflation on the real value of the
outstanding nominal government debt.

The cumulative contribution of the

deficits was to increase the ratio by 1.06, while real growth lowered the
ratio by 0.98.

The fact that ex-post inflation accounted for virtually
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TABLE •

Decompositi on of changes in U.K. debt-output ratio 1949-1983

Year

Deb i:-ou t.pu t.
ratio
(1)

2;~;
:;;:
1;5:.
., ,.. _.,..
~:'j.-;.

1~53
~

.:>I

... -

-..
....
..:..:-,.,
,--,
-'!'::,-:,
...___
.!;. ::

~

J..1:';)

I

.~.:,e
#I -

-

1,.. -

r

,

-':! :J":

1960

1961
1962

1963
196~
1965
1966

1967
19.65

1969

1970
1---·,
~I19i2
·c-i.., I~

l9i.:
19i5
1:-,
., I .,
1977
1978

1979
1980
1951

19S2
1983
198.!.

:.2s2
:.2·.!,9

:.029
1.855
l. i31
:.671
. l.578
l.~65
1 ---0
- .~I.,

l.333
1.21:.
1.2.13

Contributio n of
ou tpu th-growth

Debt-output
ratio

Contributio n
of deficits

Contributio n
of inflation

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.185
-0.033

-0.041
0.056

-0.066
-0.004

-0.071
-0.084

-0.220
-0.173
-0.126
-0.060
-0.093
-0.ll,4
.-0. 085
-0.047
-0.059
-0.061

0.009
-0.002

-0.177
-0.136
-0.056
-0.029
-0.057
-0.087
-0.055
-0.061
-0.021
-0 .021

-0.041
-0.021
-0.076
-0.063
-0.052
-0.028
-0.026
0.004
-0.043
-0.054

o.on

0.034
0.021
0.006
-0.002
0.011
0.007
0.016

l.155
l.123
1.099
l.026
0.966
0.939
0.906
0.899
0.649
o. 752

-0.032
-0.024
-0.073
-o.059
-0.028
-0.032
-0.008
-0.050
-0.097

0.021
0.017
0.044
0.013
0.007
0.027
0.018
0.060
-0.005
-0.020

-0.037
-0.035
-0.022
-0.031
-0.039
-0.036
-0.025
-0,056

-0.040
-0,013
-0.045
-0.053
-0.025
-0.018
· -0.025
-0.040
-0.013
-0.015

0.660
0.641
0.565
0.535
0. 484
0.49i
0.520
0.533
0.508
0.478

-0.084
-0.028
-0.076
-0.030
-0.051
0.013
0.023
0.012
-0.024
-0.030

0.007
0.044
0.016
0.049
0.066
0.099
0.089
0.088
0.047
0.044

-0.070
-0.062
-0.043
-0.083
-0.118
-0.067
-0.060
-0.059
-0.062
-0.082

-0.017
-0.009
-0.044
0.004
0.003
-0.019
-0.006
-0.016
-0.009
0.009

0.518
0.302
0.496
0.523

0.040
-0.016
-0.006
0.027

0.088
0.023
0.038
0.055

-0.051
-0.032
-0.027
-0.022

0.005
-0 .007
-0.017
-0.008

-1.944

1.061

-1.947

-0.98

Su::

Sci.:::ce:

t::.

See Figure 1.

-c>.oss

-o.ozs

-o.030
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all of the reduction in the debt-output ratio since 1948 should not lead
one to conclude that the way further to amortise the public debt is to
have another bout of inflation.

A conjunction of higher inflation, higher

real interest rates, low real growth, and large public sector deficits is
not unthinkable; and it would result in higher 'inflation going hand-in
hand with a rising debt burden.

Inflation, the debt burden, and real

growth are jointly endogenous variables, and, depending on the values of
the "deep" structural paramters and the nature of the exogenous disturbances
driving the economic system, almost any pattern of covariation between
them could be generated. 1f
Figure 4 shows the U.K. public sector financial deficit (PSFD) as a
proportion of GDP since 1946 and the public sector borrowing requirement
( PSBR) since 1955.

Of the two, the PSFD is the more informative, as the

PSBR puts "above the line" (counts as current receipts) the proceeds from
certain categories of asset sales which the PSFD properly puts "below the
line" (i.e., counts as financing).

Table 3 reproduces the Bank of

England's "inflation corrections" to the PSBR, i.e., an estimate of what
the PSBR would have been if debt service had been costed at ex-post real
interest rates. 6/

The PSBR explosion from 1975 (an increase in the PSBR

GDP ratio by 11.75 percentage points) is reduced to an increase in the
inflation-corrected PSBR-GDP ratio of only 3.5 percentage points (moving
from a 5.1 percent surplus to a 1.6 percent surplus).

The cumulative

inflation-corrected PSBR between 1967 and 1983 (as a percentage of GDP)
is a 19.2 percent surplus.

- 15 FIGURE4

The public sector deficit-GDP ratio in the U.K.
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TABLE 3
The "inflation -correcte d" PSBR in the U.K. since 1967

Year

£

PSBR
Billion

"Inflatio n
correctio n"
£ Billion

"Inflatio ncorrected "
PSBR £ Billion

'' Inf 1at ion-corre ct ec! ''
PSBR as a proportio n
of GDP at market prices

,,,
(4) ,.

(1)

{2)

(3)

1967

l.8

-0.8

l.O

1968

1.3

-1.2

0.1

0.2

1969

-0.5

-1.9

-2.4

-5.l

1970

-0.0

-2.7

-2.7

-5.2

l9il

1.3

-3.2

-1.9

-3.3

1972

2o0

-3.1

-1.1

-1. 7

1973

4.1

-4.0

0.1

0.1

1974

6.4

-9.3

-2.9

-3.4

1975

10.2

-11.9

-1.7

-1.6

1976

9.0

-i.5

1.5

1.2

1977

5.5

-9.4

-3.9

-2.7

1978

8.5

-6.7

1.8

1.1

1979

12. 7

-14.9

-2.2

-1.1

1980

11.8

-13 .1

-1.3

-0.6

1981

10. 6

-12.3

-1. 7

-0. 7

1982

s.o

-7.3

-2.3

-0.8

1983

11.6

-5.9·

5.7

1.9

__
.
") :,

Source:

Bank of £nsla.nd Quarterlz Bulletin., June 1980 and June 1984.

Note:

Column 2 - Sectoral net monetary assets x percentag e of change in consumer s'
deflater (an exchange rate correctio n is applied to assets and liabiliti es
denominat ed in foreign currency).
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3.

Deficits, Debt and Inflation
The fear that public sector deficits eventually will be monetized

and thus lead to inflation is a deep-root ed one among economic policy
makers, officials of treasurie s, central banks, internatio nal organiza
tions, and among the public at large.

There are two distinct but not

mutually exclusive views of the debt-defi cit-inflat ion nexus.

The first

emphasize s the incentive for a government to reduce the real value of
its outstandi ng stock of interest-b earing, nominally -denomina ted (i.e.,
non-index -linked) debt through an unexpecte d burst of inflation .

The

second, recently restated by Sargent and Wallace [1981], emphasize s the

long--run inflationa ry consequen ces of a short- or medium-te rm switch from
money or tax financing to debt f:i.nancing of a given public spending pro
graI1llll.e.

This second view does not require inflationa ry surprises in

order to be valid.

a•

.Amortizin g the public debtthrou gh inflation
There are four ways through which governmen ts can reduce the

-

real value
of their debt. 7/
.

First, at a given general price level and a

given nominal price of bonds, they can run a budget surplus.

Second,

they can attempt to reduce the real value of the outstandin g stock of
debt, at a given general price level, by pursuing or announcin g policies
that cause a drop in bond prices.

Third, an inflationa ry policy can

reduce the real value of the inherited stock of debt, even with a balanced
budget and given nominal bond prices.
repudiate part or all of its debt.
is left to the next section.

Finally, a governmen t can formally

The discussion of this final option
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Why should governments wish to reduce the real value of their debt?
We can distinguish distributional and efficiency reasons.
butional issues are fairly straightforward.

The distri

Those who hold the debt and

those who pay the taxes that service the debt are not the same people.
Typically, debt is owned (directly or indirectly through pension funds
and other financial institutions) by people who are, on average, both
older and richer than the representative taxpayer.

The recurrent caricature

of the toiling workers supporting the idle (retired?) rentiers is an
exaggerated version of this distributional conflict.

In the short run,

debt debasement favours labour, and the young in general, at the expense
of rentiers and older people.

The efficiency argument focuses on the

role of public debt in crowding out private saving and capital formation.
If the authorities judge the domestic rate of capital formation to be
less than the optimal rate, one possible remedy is to stimulate private
saving by reducing the real value of the financial claims of the private
sector on the public sector.

Provided this can be achieved without a

Keynesian slump in effective demand, such a policy will stimulate both
private saving and investment.
A systematic view of the deficit-debt-inflation nexus starts from
the consolidated government budget identity given in equation (1).
(1)

G - T

+

8/

Mt is the stock of high-powered money or base money outstanding at the
beginning of period t.

For simplicity, the entire maturity structure of

the debt is summarized by its two extremes.

Very short debt, with a
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fixed nominal market price (set equal to unity) and a variable interest
rate is, is outstanding in an amount B~.

Very long debt, perpetuities

or consols with a fixed nominal coupon, c, and a variable market price
~

=c/i~

is outstanding in amount B~.

i~ is the long nominal rate

of interest or the coupon yield on consols.

Zt is the stock of official

foreign exchange reserves, and et the price of foreign exchange. 9/

Gt is

the real value of "exhaustive" public spending on goods and S'ervices, Tt
the real value of taxes net of transfers, and Pt the general price level.
Equation (1) is often referred to as the government budget "'constraint "
or (worse) as the budget "restraint."
reflects the nature of (1).

Budget identity much more accurately

It is an identity linking all public sector

sources of funds and uses of funds together.

The constraint lies not in

(1) but in the limits we set, implicitly or explicitly, on the government' s

ability to borrow (i.e., on the real stock of debt or the debt-output
ratio), in the lower bound we impose on the stock of foreign exchange reserves
and in the constraints , political or through the demand for real money
balances, imposed on the real value of the resoures that the government
can appropriate through seigniorage:

M/P.

This issue will be reviewed

below when the solvency of the government is analysed.
We define the primary deficit, D, to be the deficit exclusive of
interest payments and other debt-service
(2)

D

-

p(G - T)

Equation (1) states the well-known fact that the primary deficit plus
interest payments on the outstanding debt must be financed by borrowing
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short or long, by printing money or by running down foreign exchange
reserves.

While even in the post-Bretton Woods era purchases and sales

of official foreign exchange reserves have not disappeared, I shall for
simplicity of exposition ignore fluctuations in official foreign exchange
holdings.
Equation (1) then simplifies to

The change in the real value of the debt, b

=BS

+ ;eLBL , is the sum of
p
.

. . D
the real value of the budget def1.c1.t
· +· i SBS
· ·+· · c,BL
•- , net of the amount of
p
money financing or seigniorage (in real terms) M/P, and the increase
(reduction) in the real value of the outstanding stock of debt due to a
falling (rising) general price level, p, and/or a rising (falling) price
of bonds, pL •
(3)

.

b

Let JJ denote the single-period or instantaneous proportional rate
of growth of the nominal money stock; JJ
of high powered money, and d

=D/p,

=M/M,

m

=M/p,

the real stock

the real primary deficit.

The

presentation of the results is facilitated greatly if we assume that the
short and long interest rates are related to each other through the
"expectations hypothesis" of the term structure.

With risk-neutral

operators in financial markets this implies that the expected rate of
return on long bonds (including any expected capital gain or loss due to
changes in the price of long bonds) must equal the yield on short bonds,
or, letting Et denote expectations formed at time t:
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( 4)

.s

l.t

We can then write the expected or planned change in the real value of the
public debt as:
( 5)

.

E( b)

-

d + rsb - JJm

If Ut denotes the surprise or unexpected value at time t, then ex
post, the actual value of the change in the real stock of debt is given
by
( 6)

.

b

=

E(b)

+

U(b)

=

Equation (6) shows that a correctly anticipated policy of inflation
will not affect the real stock of public debt outstanding unless it
affects the real primary deficit, d, the ex-ante short real interest
rate, rs, or the real revenue from money creation (real seigniorage)
lJm

=M/P.

An unanticipated inflation policy may in addition lower

the real value of the public debt by causing private bondholders to under
predict the inflation rate (U(p/p)

> 0)

the price of long-dated debt (U(pL/PL

or overpredict the increase in

< 0).

The theoretical and empirical case for an effect of a fully anti
cipated and well-understood inflation policy on the ex-ante real interest
rate is open.

1.9./

A reasonable benchmark is to assume that higher expected

inflation is fully reflected in nominal interest rates, leaving the real
rate unaffected.
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The extent to which the real primary deficit is affected by inflation
depends on the institutional, legal, administrative, and political frame
work governing the determination of public spending and taxation.

E.g.,

with a progressive and incompletely indexed tax system, there will be an
increase in the real tax burden through "bracket creep" when the general
price level rises.

Depending on the way in which they are implemented, a

system of "cash limits" may lead to an (unexpected) reduction in the real
value of public spending when there is an (unexpected) increase in the
price level.

l!)

The implications of a more inflationary policy for real seigniorage
revenue are quite straightforward.

If we limit ourselves to the case of

a sustained increase in the rate of inflation, this higher rate of
inflation is likely to be associated with an equal increase in the trend
rate of growth of base money.

Let the demand for real money balances,

md, be a decreasing function of the short nominal interest rate and of
the rate of inflation,

1r,

and an increasing function of real national

income, y, i.e.
=

'y)

.

O·

'

1

'O;

The effect of a higher rate of growth of the nominal money stock on real
seigniorage

m, if inflation changes one-for-one with money growth and if

real output and the real interest rate are invariant under changes in
the rate of inflation, is given by:

- 23 -

(7)

m

+

l-( 1 s

i

+ 1 n)

Real seigniorage, therefore, increases with the rate of money growth if
and only if the (absolute value of the) total (direct and indirect through
iS) inflation elasticity of demand for real money balances is less than

Tr/ ll.

If the natural rate of growth is not too large, this becomes the

familiar condition that higher inflation increases real seigniorage if
the inflation elasticity of demand for high-powered money is below unity.
I estimated a simple demand for high-powered money function for the
United Kingdom using annual data from 1948 to 1984.

The dependent vari

able was M/P, the real monetary base (the wide monetary base deflated by
the GDP deflator at factor cost).

Independent variables were a constant,

a time trend, current and lagged values of real output, y (real GDP at
factor cost), a short nominal interest rate, iS (the three-month Treasury
Bill yield after 1960, the three-month Treasury Bill discount rate up to
1960), a long nominal interest rate, iL (the yield on consols or the
British government securities long dated (20 years) yield), the rate of
inflation p/p (the proportional rate of change of the GDP deflator at
factor cost), and lagged values of the real monetary base.
The best estimate in terms of residual autocorrelation, parameter
stability, and goodness of fit is given below in equation (8).

(Figures

in brackets below coefficient estimates are absolute values oft statistics.)
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=

-3.47271 - .0253356t + .955959lny - .515961.E. + .669274ln(¥)
(10.0858) (9.91106) (10.2741)
(12.4063)P (16.8825)
-1

SSR = .00415094; SER - .0115716; R2 = .9916;
DW

R2

=

.9905;

= 1.8253; No. of observations= 36; 1948-84; F(4, 31)

=

912.194

When the inflation rate was included as a regressor, neither the
short interest rate nor either of the two long rates were significant.
The semi-elasticity of the demand for real base money with respect to the
inflation rate has a long•run value of -1.56.

The estimated long-run

income elasticity of demand for high-powered money is an implausibly high
2.89.

The estimate of the annual trend decline in the demand for base

money is 7.66 percent.

Ideally, the trend should capture the consequences

of institutional changes in the financial, monetary, and payments mechan
isms that were responsible for the secular increase in money base velocity
over the sample period.

It seems likely that current income captures

mainly cyclical effects on velocity and that part of the effect of trend
or permanent income is picked up by the trend term.

I tried to allow for

this by more general lag structures for y (as well as for the other
regressors), and by adding private consumption (or the sum of private and
public consumption) as a better proxy for permanent income, but this
did not yield more plausible results.

Specifying the relationship in

per capita terms worsened things, i.e., the point estimates of the longrun income elasticity of high-powered money demand and of the long-run
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annual trend decline in money demand both increased.

Simultaneity

problems may well arise in connection with equation (8), through the
output and inflation terms.

Re-estimating (8) using an instrumental

variable estimator (with public spending on goods and services, the
volume of world trade, a measure of the world price level and the U.S.
three-month Treasury Bill rate as instruments) did not lead to signifi
cantly different coefficient estimates but worsened the residual auto
correlation properties.
Frotn (8) a value of -1.5 for the inflation semi•elasticity would be
reasonable.

The annual inflation rate would have to exceed 67 percent

for a further increase in the rate of inflation to yield a reduction in
real government revenue from money creation. JJ:_/

While historical and

foreseeable inflation rates would seem to place the British economy in
the range where higher inflation rates still boost total revenue from
the "inflation tax," the amounts involved are small.

Table 4 shows the

historical insignificance of seigniorage revenue in the British economy.
It would have taken an increase in the tax burden of only 0.55 percent
of GDP in order to do away with the need for revenue from seigniorage
altogether.

It therefore seems implausible to base a positive theory

of inflation for Britain on the perceived need of successive governments
to extend the tax base and find a further source of revenue.

I would go

further and argue that the fact that we have experienced (and are still
experiencing) any inflation at all in the United Kingdom and the other
industrial countries (albeit at rates well below the seigniorage-maximizing

'
- 2 6-

TABU 4

Seignorage as a source of revenue ~n the U.K. 1948-1983

Change in money
.,
base as a I>
of GDP

Change in money
base as a %
of total tax
receipts*

Change in money base
as a % of general
govermnent taxes and
N. I. contributions

(1)

(2)

(3)

(.:.)

-1.0.!;
0.13

-2.43
0.29
0.00

-2.59
0.31
0.00

16.57

o.4i
0.52

1.24
1.94

14.05
13.38
13 .07
13.02

1.86

12. i7

1.59

0.38
0.42

1.15
1~32
l.81
l. 79
l.71
1.45
1.24
1.03
1.16

12.32
12.06
11.93
11. 77

0.52

1.48

0~44
0.12
0.24
0.57
0.5$
0.51
0.28
0.49
0.33
0.32

1.23
0.32
0.66
1.56
1.52
1.25
0.67
. 1.11
0.69
0.67

1.36
0.35

- "'I -

0.65
0.43

. '

0.8'2

o. 76
0.83
0.69
0.61
0.81
o.72
0.41

l.45
0.99
1. 97
1. 70
1.86
1.57
1.38
1.90
1.62
0.89

1.67
1.11
2.22
l.91
2.07
l.76
1.54
2.12
l.81

0.32
0.04
0.27

0.66
0.09
0.55

0.74
0.10

Year

19.:.s

. ,... , ....
~.~-~
i_o::n
_,_,,..

o.oo

1s.:1
1.952
19.53
1934

o. 6i

0.65 .
0.63
0.51

1955
1956
19Si
1958
1959
. 1960

0.44

1961
1962
1963
1954
l:~65
1S66
196·i
l-95S
:.969

1970
l971
;c-,
., ,..- ...

-. -. , f.
197!.

1975
1976
..!. o-., I I

l9iB
,c-c
i..,, I .,

lSSO
19Sl
192.2

i983
::ote:

"*

1.41
1.96

1.36
1.1.3
1.29
1.65

o. 73

1.73
1.69

1.40
0.74
1.13

0.77
0.74

LOO

0.60

Money-base
as a 7.
of GDP

- ":'".l
,_:::,.
'..,

-=> • 1.....,

, -

11.59

11.28
10.92
10.51
10.26
10.19
1c.:2
9.86
9.54
9.49
8.96
8.53
8.06
7.72
7.42
6.69
6.33 ·
6.18
6.17
6.09
5.63
5.47
5.10
4.94

Taxes, ~- 1. contributions, trading income, rent, royalties, interest etc.
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level) cannot be rationalized in terms of the optimal trade-off between
seigniorage and the other sources of revenue.

Instead it seems likely

that the increasing inflation rates and rates of monetary growth of the
sixies and seventies were the byproduct of policies aimed at maintaining
capacity utilization rates and unemployment rates in the face of deterior
ating supply-side conditions, and/or of attempts to exploit a non-existent
long-run employment-inflation trade-off, regardless of the revenue
implications of the increasing rates of monetary growth.

In other words,

the data support the screw-up theory of inflation rather than the optimal
seigniorage theory of inflation.
Not only has seigniorage historically been an insignificant source
of government revenue in the United Kingdom, my estimate of the demand
for narrow money in equation (8) suggests that the maximum possible
yield of this tax is also small.

With a constant seurl.-elasticity of

-1.S, the seigniorage-maximizing annual inflation rate is 67 percent and
the maximal seigniorage in url.d-sample 1967 is 2.74 percent of GDP.

Earlier

work yielded a seignoriage"'111B.xiurl.zing annual inflation rate of SO percent
and maximal seigniorage in mid-sample of 1.9 percent of GDP.

Both esti

mates lead one to conclude that expected inflation appears to be a costly
way of raising additional government revenue.

These calculations are

no more than recreational and should be taken as indicative, at most, of
orders of magnitude.
Seigniorage revenue, defined here as revenue from the expected
inflation tax is of course but one part of the total inflation tax.
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Unanticipated inflation is potentially the most important means by which
a government can reduce the real value of its nominally denominated
debt other than through formal repudiation or default.

From equation

(6) it can be seen that unanticipated inflation reduces the real value
of all debt (other than index-linked debt) and that an unexpected decline
in the price of long debt further reduces the real value of debt with
longer maturities.

Even moderate unexpected changes in the rate of

inflation can have dramatic effects on the market value of long-dated
non-indexed debt, if these changes are expected to persist.

This can be

seen as follows.
If the expectations theory of the term structure holds, and if short
nominal interest rates are expected to be the same in the future as they

are today, the price of consols will be related to the current short rate

-

as in equation (9). 13/
( 9)

pL( t)

=

C

iS

If the rate of inflation goes up by one percentage point and if the

short real interest rate is unaffected by the rate of inflation then the
price of consols will fall by (iL)-1 percentage points.
iL

= 0.10,

E.g., with

a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of inflation will

cause a 10 percent drop in the price of consols.

More generally, with

long bonds characterized by a constant coupon c, time remaining to matur
ity T-t, and a redemption value of pB(T), the price pB is related to the
current short interest rate if short rates are expected to remain constant
as follows:

1.!:J
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(10)

The effect of an increase in the current and expected future short
rate on the price of long bonds of any maturity is easily seen to be
negative.

11/

Higher current and expected future short nominal interest

rates associated with higher expected future inflation, which was unanti
cipated at the time that the longer maturity nominal debt was issued,
will not be reflected in the coupon rate or the issue price of these
long-term bond issues.

This will therefore lead to a fall in the market

value of this debt, and effectively serve as an unexpected levy on bond
holders.
loss.

In the bondholders' balance sheet this will show up as a capital

From the government's point of view it is akin to amortization of

part of its long-term debt.
In principle, even very short-term debt can be amortized this way,

if it is possible to engineer an unexpected instantaneous discrete jump
in the general price level.

Unlike the price of government debt instru

ments, which are traded in an organized and (technically) highly efficient
set of financial markets, the general price level (e.g., the CPI or the
GDP deflator) does not, pace the New Classical Macroeconomics, behave
like an asset price set in an efficient auction market.

In an open

economy it may be possible to "jump" the price level on an unsuspecting
private sector (through an unexpected discrete devaluation of the exchange
rate) to the extent that the relevant domestic price index moves with the
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exchange rate; but for a country like Britain this is not an attractive
option.

l!:J

With very short maturity debt, floating rate debt (and of

course index-linked debt) the scope for governments to lower the ex-post
real rate of return on their debt significantly below the ex-ante expected
real rate, is quite limited.

Figure 5 shows the reduction in the average

maturity of the British public debt that has taken place since 1945.
The data have their problems.

They reflect nominal values rather

than market values, which may be a serious matter in the case of long
debt, and the maturity classification is very coarse.

There could be

coiisiderable changes in average maturity due to changes in maturity
structure within each of the three categories which would not be picked
up by our Chart.

Finally, index-linked debt should, for our purposes, be

-

taken out of the totals. 17/ This shortening of the debt structure (which
has also occurt'ed in the United States) has made unexpected inflation
less effective as a means of liquidating real debt.

Note that merely

observin-g (ex-post) a decline in the nominal market value (and therefore
a fortiori the real value) of long-dated, non-index-linked debt during
inflationary periods is not sufficient to conclude that the government
was cheating the bondholders.

A smooth, continuous decline in nominal

bond prices (as opposed to a discrete, discontinuous drop in bond prices)
is perfectly consistent with the unfolding of an inflation scenario that
was fully anticipated right from the time the long bonds were first
issued.

Neither are negative ex-post, realized rates of return on

government debt necessarily evidence of a government welshing on its
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implicit debt obligations.

There is no economic law to ensure that ex

ante, anticipated real rates of return should be positive.

Evidence of

governmental dishonesty requires independent measurement of both ex-ante
and ex-post rates of returns on public debt and the demonstration that
deliberate government actions contributed to the private sector over
estimating the returns from holding public debt.
By issuing only index-linked debt, governments would lose the option
of reducing the real value of their debt by unexpected inflation.

Seignior

age revenue, the expected inflation tax, could of course still be extracted.
By reducing the benefits to the government from unexpected inflation, the
indexation of the public debt (and indeed of the tax-transfer and exhaustive
spending rules) might make a government commitment to a policy of stable
prices more credible and time-consistent.
b.

Debt, deficitsl and monetization
The recurrent notion that deficits will, eventually, have to be

monetized, has been formalized fairly recently in a paper by Sargent and
Wallace [1981] (see also Buiter [1982] and Sargent [1983]).
the argument can be put as follows.

Public sector deficits are financed

either by printing money or by borrowing.
output ratio b

=b/y

In a nutshell,

is kept constant:

After some date, T, the debt-

-

-

b( t) = b( T) , t ;;, T.

With an

exogenously given real primary deficit, money financing then becomes
endogenous.

It is the residual financing mode.

The real interest rate

rs is assumed to be fixed and to exceed the trend rate of growth of real
output, n.

With the debt-output ratio constant after T, new issues of
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debt are just sufficient to offset the downward effects of inflation and
real output growth on the debt-output ratio.

Money growth after Tis

therefore given by:
(11)

i(t)

-

v(t)[d(t) + (rs - n)b(T)]

t

>

T

vis the income velocity of circulation of money and d the primary
deficit as a proportion of output.
To estimate the eventual monetization implied by the fiscal stance
one must therefore calculate the "inflation-and-r eal-growth-corr ected"
deficit as a proporation of GDP:

d + (rS-n)b.

Note that the debt-

output ratio bin this calculation is a sustainable and sustained debt
output ratio.

Care must be taken not to indentify it with the currently

observed ratio of the market value of the public debt to output, when one
wishes to estimate the inflation-and-re al-growth-corre cted deficit that
would be observed if a lower rate of inflation were to be achieved
unexpectedly.

Assume such an unexpected reduction in inflation leaves rs

unchanged and reduces current and expected future iS one-for-one.

At a

given general price level, the real value of nominally denominated, long
dated debt will increase as a result of the decline in current and expected
future short nominal interest rates (see equations (9) and (10) and the
discussion of this issue in the previous subsection.)

(rS-n)(BS/pY +

pLBL/pY) will therefore increase even if rs, n, Bs, BL, p and Y are
unchanged, because pL will increase.

In order to stabilize the debt-output

ratio at its current value, surpluses (measured conventionally) will
have to be run to couteract the increase in the real value of long-dated
nominal debt as inflation declines. 18/
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from equation (11).

First, if

the real interest rate exceeds the real growth rate, a higher debt-output
ratio will be associated with a higher proportional rate of growth of
the nominal money stock, unless velocity falls (the demand for money per
unit of output increases) so as to offset the higher debt service burden.
If the real interest rate instead of being constant increased with the
debt-output ratio, these conclusions would be reinforced (see W.R. Buiter
[1982]).

Thus, any financing policy prior to T that leads to increased

debt accumulation (a higher value of b(T)), will require higher
real seigniorage lJm after T, and thus, if money demand is less than unit
elastic with respect to the inflation rate, a higher rate of growth of
nominal money and, sooner or later, more inflation.
We saw before that the (steady-state) revenue from seigniorage is
maximized when the inflation elasticity of money demand equals (approxi
mately) unity.

If inflation is a "bad," no rational government would

permit inflation to rise above the seigniorage-ma:idtnizing level, i.e.,
operate on the wrong side of the "seigniorage Laffer curve."
In Britain, the income-velocity of circulation of high-powered money

has risen steadily since the end of World War II, from 5.00 in 1946 to 20.24
in 1983.

Even in the most favourable case where velocity is constant

rather than increasing with the rate of inflation, a British government
would be unlikely to choose to finance an increase in debt service due
to a higher debt-output ratio by printing money rather than by raising
explicit taxes.

With a constant velocity of 20 and a real interest rate
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that is 2 percentage points above the trend growth rate of output, an
extra 10 percentage points on the debt-output ratio would require a
4.0 percent increase in the rate of money growth and thus in the long-run
rate of inflation.

11/

To finance the increased debt service at an

unchanged rate of inflation by raising taxes would require an increase in
taxes (or cut in transfer payments) equal to one-fifth of one percent of
GNP only. 20/

It would be very unlikely for an economy like the United

Kingdom, with a well-developed financial system (reflected in a high
money base velocity) and a reasonably broad tax base, to choose .. secular"
money financing over tax financing.

The situation is of course quite

different for a number of third world countries.

Many of them have

relatively rudimentary internal financial systems, reflected, among
oth~r things, in a much lower money base velocity.

Many also have a

very narrow tax base and the administrative and political constraints on
raising taxes and cutting public spending may be more severe than in the
industrialized countries..

Even in Britain in the immediate post-World

War II years, when money base velocity was about 5, the cost of a 10 per
centage point increase in the debt-output ratio would (with a constant
velocity) only have been a 1 percent rise in the inflation rate.

Note

that the relative atractiveness of seigniorage versus explicit taxation
is not affected if we recognize that the real interest rate is likely to
increase with the debt-output ratio, as this affects the amounts to be
raised through seigniorage or taxation equally.
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4.

Deficits, Debt and Solvency
The ultimate nightmare of every Chancellor of the Exchequer must be.

the notion of state bankruptcy, of a default by the government on some or
all of its liabilities.

We get some idea of what such a doomsday scenario

implies by disaggregating the government budget identity (l') as in (12)
(12)

Total government exhaustive spending is broken down into consumption
spending, cG; depreciation of the public sector capital stock, o KG,
where

c

is the depreciation rate and KG the public sector capital stock;

and net public sector investment,

i.G,

i.e., G

two further sources of government revenue.

= cG +

c~ + i.G.

There are

The first is income from

G where
.
capital pKK,
PK is the rate of return on public sector capital

appropriated by the government.

This could of course be negative and

need bear no relation to the social rate of return on public sector
capital.

The second is the income accruing to the government from its

ownership of natural resource property rights pNNG.

North Sea oil

revenue would fall into this category for Britain.

On the left-hand

side of (12) one further financing mode is recognized: the sale by the
government of its assets, specifically of its ownership claims on natural
resources which are sold at a price pN.

All sales of existing assets

properly belong to the "financing" category.

They are put "below the
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line" or on the left-hand side of (12).

As noted, the public sector

financial deficit (PSFD) in principle conforms with the left-hand-side
of (12), the PSBR does not.

It includes certain financing items (such

as the sale of public sector assets when this involves a loss of public
sector majority ownership) as current revenue (above the line).

The

reasons for this uniformative way of presenting the data are lost in
history.

iG

on the right-hand-side of (12) represents net investment

spending on currently produced capital goods only.
British Telecom belongs on the left-hand-side.

The privatization of

Foreign assets and liabil

ities are omitted for simplicity.
While the statistics contain seris for cG, pKG, and i_G, the mapping
of the statistical aggregates into the economic categories of consumption,
depreciation, and capital formation is very unsatisfactory.

Current

expenditure on education and health is classified as final consumption
rather than (in part) as human capital formation or as depreciation.

Law

and order and defense should not be classified as consumption but either
as spending on intermediate goods (i.e., not counted directly in value
added at all) or as a form of capital expenditure.
a.

The solvency constraint
If expected (ex-ante) rates of return on all assets are equalized,

we can solve (sum or integrate) the government's current period budget
identity over time and obtain the public sector's intertemporal budget
identity given in (13)
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.

M
BS(t) + pL(t)BL(t)) + PV(T, t, rs)+ PV(-p,
t, rs)+
(

p< t)

PV((pK-l)K, t, rs)+ Q(t)
PV(cG, t, rS) denotes the present value, at time t, of the govern
ment's planned or expected real consumption spending programme, from now

-

until Kingdom Come, when rs is the instantaneous discount rate. 21/
Similarly, PV(T, t, rS) is the present value of the government's real tax
transfer programme and PV(M/P, t, rs) the present value of future real
seigniorage.

Equation (13) states that the present va:lue of the govern

ment's consumption programme (on the left-hand-side) should equal its
"net worth," the excess of the value of its assets over its liabilities
Its assets are partly tangible (and potentially

(on the right-hand-side).

marketable) and partly intangible (and non-marketable).

The stock of

publicly-owned capital is valued by the present value of the future quasi
~

rents accruing to the public sector, i.e., pK(t)

PV( Pg:, t, rs) and

natural resource property rights are valued by the present value of the
income accruing from their exploitation, pN(t)

-

Pl/(~, t, rs).

Note again that PK(t) (and/or PN(t)) could be negative, if the public
capital stock (natural resource endowment) is operated at a loss.
are two intangible assets in the government's balance sheet:

There

the present

value of future taxes net of transfers Pll(T, t, rS); and the present value

.

of future seigniorage PV(M/p, t, rS).

On

the liability side, there are

the two interest-bearing financial debt instruments Bs and BL.

']d/
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Government net worth is an increasing (decreasing) function of the
size of the future public sector capital formation programme to the extent
that the shadow price of public sector capital (pK) exceeds (falls short
of) its opportunity cost which, without loss of generality, we set equal
to 1.

If, at the margin, public and private sectors use capital with an

equal degree of inefficiency, public sector capital formation does not
alter public sector net worth.

By the same token, privatization of public

sector assets or nationalization of private assets (on private market
terms) affects public sector net worth only to-the extent that the assets
are used with different degrees of efficiency in the public and private
sectors.

PV((pK-l)K, t, rs) measures the present value of the future

planned public sector capital formation programme.
The last item in the intertemporal budget identity finally perm.its us
to turn it into anintertempora l budget constraint or solvency con:straint.
It is easily checked that nt is the present value of the government's
expected net terminal tangible liabilities. 23/

The solvency constraint is

Sl(t) -= 0, which gives us (14) as the public sector's intertemporal

present value budget constraint.

(14)

.
PV[T - cG + (pK-l)K, t, rs]+ Pv(:, t, rs),
The solvency constraint sets a limit on the growth, in the very long
run, of the government's planned or expected net marketable or tangible
liabilities.
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If the real interest rate rs exceeds the natural rate of growth of
output, n, the terminal or transversality condition ~t) = 0 is implied by
the weak and rather reasonable requirement that the ratio of net market
able public sector debt to trend output remains bounded. 24/

If the real

interest rate lies below the natural growth rate, honest Ponzi games
(servicing existing debt through further borrowing) are perfectly feasible
There exist well

n{t) = 0 is arbitrary and ad-hoc.

and the conditoin

known theoretical models that can be characterized by dynamically
inefficient competitive equlibria with rs

< n.

The post-World War II

experience until the late seventies provides ample evidence of a multi
year run of (ex-post) real rates of interest below the natural growth rate.
Following established practice, I'll assume in what allows that, at
any rate in the long run, rs> n, and impose S?{t)

~

0 as the government's

solvency constraint.
Equation (14) states that the market value of the government's net
non--monetary debt has to be matched by the present value of the expected
future primary current surpluses and the present value of expected future
seigniorage.

(14 I)

It can be rewritten as in (14')

BS( t) + pL( t)BL( t)
P( t)Y( t)

PV(

T-cG

.

+ ( Prl)K
y

M

, t, rS-n) + PV( PY' t, rS-n)

Equation (14') expresses the same relationship in terms of net
debt-output ratios, future primary current surpluses as a share of GNP
and seigniorage as a proportion of GNP.

The relevant discount rate
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in this second set of present value calculations is the real interest
rate minus the natural rate of growth.

Note that the appropriate primary

deficit is the government's current account deficit.
formation is netted out.

Public capital

Only if the value of public sector capital

differs from its opportunity cost should allowance be made for public
sector capital formation.
Six short points should be made about the formalism of the solvency
constraint before we turn to the theory and practice of repudiation.

-

First, equations (14) arid (14') discount r eal values. at real interest
rates.

~

An equivalent expression can be derived by discounting nominal

values at nominal interest rates.

'l:2.I

Discounting real values at nominal

interest rates would be an irrational procedure, although Modigliani and
Cohn [1981] have argued that such behavior accounts for the undervaluation
of the stock market in inflationary periods.
Second, consider what would happen if, contrary to my assumption,
n

> rs.

. =G + rsb -

Using the simplified budget constraint b

T, where

all public spending G is current, all bonds are short, index-linked
bonds, and there is no money, it is easily seen that the forward-looking
present value budget identity is not defined.

However, the debt-output

ratio is perfectly well-behaved for any finite primary deficit as a
proportion of output, d.

-

b( t)

=
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The steady-state value of the debt-output ratio, bis given by
b

=

d

There is no solvency constraint for this government.

There are,

obviously, "physical" constraints such as the condition that, in a closed
economy, 0 ( G ( 1.

The choice of borrowing versus taxation depends

exclusively on distributional criteria and on the relative efficiency
costs of debt versus tax financing.

In spite of a positive share of

public spending in national income, taxes need never be levied and may
indeed be negative forever.

2:1/

Third, the solvency constraint permits us to take a forward-looking
view of the "eventual monetization" implied by the fiscal-financial pro
gramme, discussed in the previous section.

From (14' ) we get, holding

M/M and pY/M = v constant:

(15)

M

M -

vR(t) [PV(

CG - T + (1-PK.)i

Y

, t, rS-n) +

BS(t) + pL(t)BL(t)

Pl{(t)KG(t)

p(t)Y(t)

Y(t)

PN(t)~(t)]
Y(t)

Equation (15) solves for the constant rate of growth of base money
that is implied, as a residual, to satisfy the solvency constraint, by
the current and prospective future plans for the primary deficit and the
initial stock of non-monetary debt.

The "net liability" on the right

hand-side of (15) is annuitized using the long real interest rate net of
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-

the rate of growth of output R. 28/

If the policies summarized in (15)

are inconsistent with a constant velocity, we can rephrase the question

.

in terms of the constant (permanent) share of seigniorage in GNP M/pY
that is implied by the current spending and taxation plans and by the
already outstanding net debt obligations.

This amounts simply to dividing

both sides of (15) by v.
Fourth, the various items in the solvency constraint are unlikely to
be behaviourally independent of each other.
dependencies is of course model-specific.

The nature of these inter
For a Keynesian world, e.g., a

cut in the spending programme PV(cG, t, rS) will reduce effective demand
and output, reduce the tax base and, at given tax rates and interest rates,
reduce PV(T, t, rs).

Changes in the rate of inflation, brought about

through changes in the seigniorage programme l'V(M/p, t, rS) may alter
the future capital intensity of production and thus the tax base.

Many

other linkages can be thought of.
Fifth, the government's assets net of its liabilities were referred
to as government "net worth," W.
a certain abuse of language.

W

It might be argued that this involves

=pKKG

+ pNNG + PV( T, t, rs) + PV(M/p,

t, rS) + PV((pK-l)K, t, rs) - [BS(t) + pL(t)BL(t)] is to a large extent a
p( t)

choice variable of the government (even ignoring the possibility of
default), as the government can choose, within bounds, its tax-transfer
programme, its monetary growth targets, and its capital formation pro
gramme.

Whether or not we wish to use the term "net worth," with its
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connotation of something parametric to the agent, in connection with W,
the mutual consistency of the consumption programme and W, PV(cG, t,
rs)

=W( t)

represents a valid solvency constraint.

Sixth, it is easily checked that after-tax rates of interest should
be used to discount future flows of revenues and expenditures (see Buiter
[1984]).

The stream of current and future taxes net of transfers T that

enters into the present value calculations should be total taxes net of
transfers minus the receipts from income and capital gains taxes on the
ass.ets and liabilities appearing in the solvency constraint.
There has been no empirical attempt to implement the comprehensive
balance sheet accounting outlined here.

In a recent paper, John Hills

[1984] presented estimates of some of the less conventional assets and
liabilities.

His "full" balance sheet of the public sector is presented

below in Tables.
It includes estimates of pKG~ (physical assets, but excluding much
of the social infrastructure (roads, sewers, etc.); since very few of
these social overhead assets yield any cash return to the public sector,
omission is not a serious matter for the purpose of constructing the
public sector comprehensive balance sheet.)

PNNG is measured by future

oil reserves and a subset of PV(T, t, rS) is included (corporate deferred
tax and pensions deferred tax component, state pension, unfunded public
service pensions).

Omitted are the rest of PV(T, • , • ), the present

value of taxes net of transfers, subsidies etc., PV(M/P, • , • ), the
present value of future seigniorage and PV((Prl)K, • , • ), the present
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John Hills'esti mated "full" balance sheet of the U.K.

ublic sector

(£billion.coat terms. 31 !vlardi 1982 prices)
1957
(end Dec)

1966
(end Dec)

1975
(end Dec}

1982
{end Mar)

.dS.utr

Physical (including
shares and land)'

Financial'
Fuwre oil reYatues

130

220

35

♦O

i

Corporariona. defen'ed ta:,<

+20

♦ 15

H

35

70

105

10

Pensio11a --

deferred cu component•

10-15

20

35-45

60-65

175-180

280

575-585

620-625

Financial'

195

195

150

135

Seate Pension I
• - Buie
- Eamiit!S Rewed

235(mu)

340(maz)

390

390-415

TOT.JI.

l.ioiiilw

~

+o

Uofundcd Public Serv~

Pensions'

20

TOTAL.

NETL/A.BIUT Y

7

30

.

90-115

~

120-14-0

♦50(max)

565(rnax)

630-655

685-730

275(mu)

285(nwc.)

55-70

65-105

( All figures rounded to nean:sr £.5 billion)

I
2

3

+
5

6

7

Fi!IJm for physic:al and fin-.ncial asseu and fi1tancial liabilities from Table 1.7.
Figures for value of future oil revenues supplied by IFS North Sea Oil Revenue
pru~. See Devereux and Morris (1983) f o r ~ of oil revenue model. Present
value of fuwre revenues derived using 3 % rul discount rate. Oil pm assumed ro
incn:ase in real terms by 3 'JI, per annum frvm level ar date for which estimate is made.
Further details in Hills tl98+), Section C.
·
Value of Corporations· defened we liabilit, taken to be twice allowance made by 67 of
the 100 !arJest UK companies (,ee pqe 15 above).
Liability ar standanllbasic rare on 75 ~ of righcs in funded tchemes. earnings-rewed
Staie pensions and unfunded public ,ervice pensiom. See H"&lls (198+). Section F.
Value of public sector· s liability for basic pensioftS ar cnd-1975 is based on Government
A ~ ' s estimates given in Diamond Commiuioc (1976), Table 38 for 31 March
1976. E.stima1e includes graduated pension rights. Lower limit for basic pensions ar
end-March 1982 based on IIU4Ni &wnw ~ 1983 estimate for mid-financial year
1981-82. For derivation of Other estinwes ,cc Hills (1984), Section£.
1957 and 1966 figur= from Roe (1971). For other elOfflaff::I see Hills (198+). Secaoa
E.
Ranges given in 1975 and 1982 allow for imcrr:lependell of and liability figures
rela.iing to pensions.

'•c·••

·.-;~.. -=-_'{,,c.,.:.' ;...-..
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value of the "excess returns" (if any) from future planned public sector
capital formation if public sector capital is used more efficiently, at
the margin, than private capital.

While one can quarrel with each and

every one of Hill's figures, the need to go through an exercise of this
kind in order to evaluate the feasibility and consistency of public sector
fiscal-financial-monetary plans is beyond doubt.

If we take e.g. Hill's 1982 figure of a net liability of between 65
and 105 billion f's (at March 1982 prices) at face value, this means that
for solvency the remaining items in the comprehensive balance sheet but not
in the Rills calculations, should add up to a net asset of 65 to 105 bil
lion f's.

These items are:

(1) the present value of future seigniorage;

(2) the present value of future taxes net of transfers, excluding debt
service and the taxes and transfers already considered by Hills (oil
revenues, state and public service pensions, etc.); (3) mit).us the present
value of public sector consumption; and (4) the present value of any excess
returns from future public sector investment.
With annual velocity constant at 20, a non..;inflationary future (with

M/M

= .03, say) and a real interest rate of 3 percent per annum would (in

1982) have given us a present value of future seigniorage figure of
13.9 billion f's.

Doubling this or halving this, it remains small beer

(a mere 0.15 percent of GDP in the illustrative example).
amounts to £51.1 billion to £91.1 billion in 1982.

The remainder

With the real interest

rate 2 percentage points above the trend real growth rate, this represents
the need for a "residual" 29/ permanent primary surplus of between
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Adding back in the annuitized value 12_/ of

0.37 and 0.66 percent of GDP.

future oil revenues, the deferred tax component of pensions and taking out
the annuitized value of public sector pension liabilities, raises the
required total permanent primary surplus to between 3.1 and 3.7 percent
of GDP.
1982.

1lJ

Interest payments on the public debt were 5.3 percent of GDP in
A conventionally measured public sector financial deficit of

between 1.63 and 2.2 percent of GDP in 1982 would therefore ha:ve been
"sustainable" according to these back-of-the-envelope calculations.

One

can contrast this with the kind of sustainability calcu1ation that ignores
all intangible assets and liabilities and proceeds as follows.

Jnt.erest

bearing public debt is 50 percent of annual GDP in the United Kingdom.
·The trend growth rate of real GDP is, say, 2.5 percent per year.
inflation is to be stabilized at, say, 5 percent per year.

Assume

The interest

bearing debt-output ratio will therefore be stabilized when new bond
issues are 3.75 percent of GDP.

With the income velocity of circulation

of base money constant at 20, say, the sustainable PSFD as a proportion
of GDP would be 4.1 percent.

If a zero inflation scenario is envisaged,

the sustainable PSFD as a proportion of GDP (ignoring any effects of lower
inflation on the debt-output ratio and on velocity) would be 1.4 percent.
b.

Sustainable fiscal-financial-moneta ry plans
The "balance sheet" solvency constraint in (14) or (14') in one

sense tells us all there is to know about solvency.

Feasible or consistent

fiscal, financial, and monetary plans should satisfy this identity.

Any

particular set of plans or projections may, however, fail to satisfy this
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identity.

If a government attempted to implement its spending, tax

transfer and monetization programme, insolvency, i.e., debt repudiation
would occur to satisfy, ex-post, the constraint that was violated exante.

There are a number of alternative ways of measuring the extent or

magnitude of the departure from solvency, each one of which emphasizes a
feature of the plans already implicit in the balance sheet solvency
constraint.

Such measures of inconsistency can be expressed, for instance,

as flow deficits or deficits as a proportion of output.

This brings out

the sustained or permanent changes in spending programmes, revenue raising
programmes, or seigniorage plans that are required to eliminate the
ex-ante discrepancy in the government's comprehensive balance sheet.
c.

The "permanent deficitt'
Consider an inconsistent or infeasible fiscal-financial-monetary

plan.

This is characterized by PV(cG, t, rs) - W(t)

=o.

Such an excess

or shortfall of spending over resources will not, of course, be observed
ex-post.

Something will give to re-establish ex-post equality, whether

this takes the form of changing PV(cG, t, rs) or W(t) or both.
The "permanent deficit," F, is the real perpetuity equivalent or
annuity value of the discrepancy in the government's ex-ante comprehensive
balance sheet.
(16)

F(t)

It is given by:
-

R(t) [PV(cG, t, rS) - W(t)]

R(t) is the coupon yield on an index-linked ("real") consol or the long
real rate of interest. 32/
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F, the "permanent deficit share" measures the constant fraction of
trend GNP, Y, that corresponds to the balance sheet discrepancy .

It is

given by (17).
(17)

R(t) [PV(cG, t, rS) - W(t)]

F(t)

Y(t)

While these ex-ante "permanent deficits" will not materialize ex-post,
let alone be permanent, they do represent the perma11ent adjustment that
must be made, to spending, to receipts, or to seigniorage , in order to
achieve solvency.
Two further informative deficit measures are the constant net worth
deficit, Fw, and the permanent income deficit, FP.

It is easily checked

that the expected rate of change of public sector net worth is given by

The current level of public sector consumption spending can be said
to be sustainable if it keeps net worth constant (ex-ante).

This will be

the case when real public sector consumption equals rsw, the current
expected real rate of return times public sector net worth.

The constant

net worth deficit is then given by

=

(19)

If one's criterion for the sustainabil ity of current consumption
involves the maintenance of a constant (ex-ante) ratio of public sector
net worth to capacity output, the sustainable consumption level is given
by (rS-n)W.

The constant net worth share deficit is then defined as
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cG(t) - (rS(t) - n)W(t)
Y(t)

(20)

The level (share) of public sector consumption consistent with
constant net worth (or a constant net worth share) will be subject to
anticipated fluctuations over time if the short real interest rate varies
over time.

A permanent income approach to the sustainability of public

sector consumption plans has been proposed by Miller (Miller [1983],
Miller and Babbs [1983)).

The highest indefinitely sustainable constant

level of public sector consumption (or public sector permanent income) is
given by R(t)W(t).

The anticipated rate of change of permanent income is

given by R(t)[R(t)W(t) - cG(t)].

The permanent income deficit can then

be defined as
(21)

rP(t)

-= cG(t) - R(t)W{t)

Finally, if a constant share of public sector consumption in trend
output is taken as one's criterion for the sustainability of current con
sumption, the permanent income share deficit is the appropriate measure
(22)

=

cG(t) - R(t)W(t)
Y(t)

Each of these "permanent deficits" measures the magnitude of the
long-run inconsistency, expressed as a flow of spending or income, in the
government's fiscal, financial, and monetary plans, according to some
notion of long-run sustainability.

As presented here, the measures

singled out current public current spending on goods and services
(public consumption) from all other outlays and receipts.

It should,
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however, be clear that the sustainabil ity of any public spending programme
can be evaluated simply by transferring the present value of the relevant
outlays (e.g., transfer payments plus subsidies) to the left-hand-si de of
the present value budget constraint.
measure,

GA,

The augmented public spending

its present value PV(GA, t, rS), and the correspondin g

augmented public sector net worth measure, wA, can then be put through
their paces as in equations (16), (17), and (19)-(22).
None of these measure convey any information about the short-run or
long-run stance of fiscal policy as regards its effect on aggregate
demand.

To obtain measures of fiscal stance or fiscal impact on the

economy, an explicit model of the economy is required.

The solvency

constraint and the various permanent deficit measures are merely a useful
accounting framework for organizing facts and plans about fiscal, financial,
and monetary policy, and for evaluating the mutual consistency of spending
and revenue projections , public sector debt objectives, and monetary
targets.

It behavioral content is limited t.o the (restrictive ) assumption

of certanty equivalence that permitted us to equate ex-ante expected
rates of return on all non-monetary assets.

To make the forecasts of

future tax receipts, transfer payments and real interest rates required
to implement the present value and permanent deficit calculation s, some
model of the economy will of course in general be necessary.
d.

Debt repudiation
What happens if current plans, projections , and expectations add

up to a violation of the solvency constraint and PV(cG, t, rS)

> W(t)?

The government could achieve a consistent set of plans by cutting spending
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(PV(cG, t, rS)) or by raising taxes (PV(T, t, rS)).

It could also try to

fill the hole in its balance sheet by increasing the revenue brought in

.

from seigniorage (PV(M/P, t, rS)).

An

increase in the revenue accruing

from the public ownership of capital would also help close the gap.
would be an increase in PK in equation (14')).

(This

Finally, if at the maring,

public sector investment yields cash returns in excess of (below) its
opportunity cost, an increase (decrease) in the scale of the public
•

s

sector investment programme could do the trick (PV((pK - l)K), t, r )).
If a corrective combination of such policy measures is not implemented,

the residual item in the present value budget constraint, the real value
BS(t) + pL(t)BL(t)
of public sector debt
· ·.
will h.ave to give.
'
p(t)
'
We already reviewed the option of reducing the real value of debt
and debt service by inflation.

This leaves the option of cutting real

debt and debt service by repudiation or. special taxation (capital levies,
forced loans or conversions, and special levies on government debt).
Arithmetically, repudiation (partial or complete) would seem to be a
means for reconciling otherwise inconsistent spending and revenue plans.
Why then don't governments make use of it more frequently?

One reason is

that repudiation or a massive capital levy is perceived as a breach of
public faith and is politically and electorally unattractive.

The point

is well-made by the Committee on National Debt and Taxation (1927,
P• 295-296).
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"We do not suggest that a levy would necessari ly arouse
feelings of the most violent kind. We are convinced , however,
that it would be strongly resented ••• exception al circumsta nces
are required to reconcile the owner of capital wealth to the
levy idea. The oppositio n is no doubt founded partly on
political suspicion and on prejudice : to impose a capital
levy would be, as Mr. Keynes expressed , to insult a set of
very strong irrationa l feelings in men, and such grounds of
oppositio n are exceeding ly difficult to overcome. It is
possible that time may bring a change of ideas."
Second, repudiatio n or a major capital levy would not just represent
a redistrib ution of wealth from rentiers to tax-payer s, but would also be
likely to have serious consequen ces for the private financial system.
The enforceab ility of private contracts will be in doubt when the govern
ment is openly or effective ly in breech of contract (implicit or explicit) .
Finally, if a governmen t considers it likely that it may wish to borrow
again at some stage in the future it will (since the terms on which it
will be able to do so will reflect its reputation ) weigh the advantage s
of current repudiatio n against the enhanced future cost of debt service
should it repudiate now.

Using the analysis made familiar in the liter

ature on (Third World) external debt and repudiatio n, the rate of return
payable on the public debt will include a risk premium reflecting the
probabili ty of default.

Beyond some point, however, a further increase

in the risk premium payable on the debt may make repudiatio n so much more
attractiv e to the debtor that a rational lender would prefer not to
increase his exposure.

Credit rationing results:

borrow more on any terms. 33/ 34/

the governmen t cannot
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The preceding considerations make it seem unlikely that a government
in one of the major industrialized countries would resort to wholesale
repudiation of domestically-held public debt under peace-time conditions.
In the aftermath of a war or following a major change in the political
regime, however, rough treatment of private holders of public debt has
not been uncommon.
In France in 1770, when the government faced the financial consequences
of its participation in the American War of Independence., Abbe Terray
effectively repudiated one-fifth of French government debt through a
forcible refunding operation (see

c.

Kindleberger [1984, p. 217)).

Ricardo, in the years following the Napoleonic wars, advocated a
capital levy, and in Parliament said that such a tax was the best, in
fact the only, way of handling the burden of accumulated wartime debt
(Kindleberger [1984, p. 62)).

This proposal was not taken up, however.

More recently, Germany has had two monetary reforms in the last 62
years, both of which involved a form of capital levy.

After the hyper

inflation in 1923, a mortgage on agricultural and industrial land served
as backing for the new currency, the Rentenmark.

The German monetary

reform of 1948 consisted of a conversion of all money and debts at 10:1
(except for the first 60 Reichsmarks of currency per capita).

Since

private debtors had, for the most part, paid all their private creditors
by then, the conversion involved mainly public debt.

A further capital

levy (or Lastenausgleich) of 50 percent on the value of all real property
and equity holdings was intended to correct at least in part the inequity

- 55 -

as between owners of debt (which suffered a reduction in value of 90 per
cent) and owners of real assets and shares of corporations.

For political

reasons, the capital levy was introduced in September 1948 separately
from (and slightly later than) the conversion. ]l/
For Italy, a capital levy to reduce the burden of the debt has been
advocated recently by Basevi and Giavazzi [1983).

The distinction between

.. legitimate" or conventional tax increases and confiscatory capital
levies is of course one of degree rather than kind and inevitably involves
an element of subjective judgement.

There would seem to be no economic

or moral grounds for giving priority to safeguarding the owners of govern
ment debt against unexpected levies in preference to owners of real indus
trial and human capital.

As regards Britain, with a debt burden that is

low by historical standards, with a safe middle-of-the-pack position
among the major industrialized countries in terms of the level, and a
uniquely favourable position as regards the trend of the debt-output
ratio, the spectre of de jure or de facto repudiation should not haunt
the holders of the British public debt.

Most other industrialized coun

tries would seem to be in a similar position, although the high and
rising debt burdens of Italy and Belgium (see Table 1) might be a cause
for concern to those with a high propensity to wor_ry.
"Selective" repudiation of the public debt (e.g., through an open
ended Ponzi-style rescheduling of externally-held debt) has been more
common.

The Latin American foreign debt repudiations of the 30s and the

recent de facto external insolvency of Poland, Zaire, and a number of the
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smaller Latin American countries are reminders of the possibility of
sovereign default.

All the more so since none of these defaults involved

the kind of dramatic political upheaval and change of regime that led to
the repudiation of the Tsarist debt by the new Soviet regine and of the
Batista debt by the Castro government in Cuba.

Nevertheless, the condi

tions, whether political or economic, that have historically been associated
with repudiation of externally-held public debt, seem sufficiently
different from those faced by today's industrialized countries that even
such "selective" debt repudiations seem rather unlikely.
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5.

Crowding Out
Even if there is no fear of eventual monetization of the deficit and

if the government can credibly commit itself to the pursuit of a fiscal
financial-monetary policy mix that does not imply explosive and unsustain
able growth of the debt-output ratio, there may still be objections to
policies involving larger deficits and debt-output ratios.

The argument

against debt-financed fiscal expansion is often cast in terms of the
"crowding out" of private economic activity by fiscal policy actions.

I

shall continue to focus my discussion of crowding out on an analysis of
the consequences of substituting public borrowing for tax financing of a
given exhaustive public spending programme.

These consequences include

the effect on private saving, investment, and the current account of the
balance of payments in ·the short run, and on the capital intensity of
production and the country's net external asset position in the long run.
Much of what I shall be saying can be applied (with obvious modifications)
to the analysis of bond-financed increases in exhaustive public spending
or even to tax-financed increased in exhaustive public spending (i.e.,
balanced-budget fiscal expansions).

With lump-sum taxes, perfect capital

markets, and effectively inifitely-lived private households, the substi
tution of borrowing for tax-financing has no effect on any real (or
nominal) economic variable.

To avoid such implausible debt neutrality

features while retaining the optimizing approach so dear to economists,
it is sufficient to adopt the overlapping generations model 12._/ (without
operative gift and bequest motives) or the uncertain lifetimes model. E__/
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Institutional or information constraints on lending and borrowing activi
ties of private agents further shorten their effective decision horizons
through a variety of liquidity constraints, cash-flow constraints, large
spreads between lending and borrowing rates and other capital market
imperfections.

The models underlying the discussion of crowding out in

this section all rely on differences between public and private sector
opportunity sets as regards the terms and conditions of access to capital
markets.

Frequently this dependence is, as with the familiar Keynesian

demand multiplier, only implicit.

The non-lump sum nature of taxes will

at times be important in the discussion that follows.
a.

Qld-Fashione<i Keynesian Short-Run Crowdin~ Out
The "short run" of old-fashioned Keynesian or classical crowding

out refers to the assumption that changes in the outstanding stocks
(private non-human wealth, dometic capital, government debt, high-powered
lllO.ney, and net foreign assets) brought about by the flows (private saving,
investment, government borrowing, monetization, and foreign investment)
over the period under consideration are very small relative to the stocks
and can be ignored.

Expectations (of future interest rates, exchange

rates, prices or demand) are also taken as given, i.e., ignored.
"Crowding out" in what follows refers only to what I have called
elsewhere "indirect crowding out."

"Direct crowding out" occurs when

government instruments (especially public spending) are arguments in
private utility functions or production possibility sets.

"Indirect

crowding out" refers to the effects on the level and composition of output
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of tax cut or a spending increase, without these government controls
directly affecting utility or production, but only through effects on
budget constraints , interest rates, exchange rates, wages, or prices
(Buiter [1977]).
"Keynesian" means that demand effects only are considered.

In terms

of the familiar IS-LM, aggregate demand-aggr egate supply analysis, we
consider the horizontal shift of the aggregate demand schedule (at a
given price level) and the composition of that change in terms of changes
in investment, consumption , or the current account balance.

Supply con

straints are assumed to be non-binding (the aggregate supply schedule is
horizontal over the relevant range).
The closed economy version of this model is givey in equations (23)
to (27).
(23)

C(Yd, W) + I(r) + G = y

(24)

i(r, Y, W)

(25)
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A tax cut (say a reduction in 60) will shift the IS curve to the
right in Figure 6a.

At the initial interest rate, and the initial price

level, the new income-expe nditure equilibrium moves from Eo to Eo'•

The

income-rela ted demand for money increases and since monetary policy is non
accomodatin g (the nominal money stock is fixed) interest rates rise and a
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new IS-LM equilibrium is established at E1represents "crowding out."

The movement from Eo to E1

Whether this crowding out should be attributed

to the fiscal stimulus or to the unwillingness of the monetary authorities
to expand the ~oney supply in an accommodating manner to keep r from
rising above ro is a semantic question.

Given the path of the money stock,

the degree of crowding out varies inversely with the interest sensitivity
of money demand.
What is crowded out?
it is either C or I.
cuts.

In the closed economy represented in Figure 6,

The conventional story runs in terms of income tax

With current disposable income an argument in the consumption

function, and investment a decreasing function of the interest rate and
independent of (or only weakly increasing with) the level of economic
activity, private consumption at E1 is higher than at Eo and private
investment is lower.
A different picture emerges when the tax cut takes the form of an
investment subsidy.

This case is represented in Figure 6c.

Now both

private consumption and private investment are increased at E1•

Of course

private investment is lower at E1 than it would ahve been at Eo' (at the
lower level of interest rates) but it is higher than at Eo• 38/
What could make the demand mulitplier negative?

Mankiw and Summers

[1984] have argued that taxes may enter the money demand function directly.
Output, Y, according to their argument, is a very inappropriate transac
tions variable and should be replaced by consumption or disposable income.
While one can agree with their characterization of current output or
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income as an inadequate measure of transactions demand, the same objec
tions would seem to apply to current consumption or current disposable
income.

These too ignore intemediate transactions (which add up to a

total several times larger than transactions in final goods and services)
and transactions in existing assets (which dwarf all other transactions).
It also takes money to pay taxes or to save (i.e., to acquire non-monetary
assets).

Finally, the alternative motivation of the scale variable in

the money demand function, associated with Milton Friedman, is in terms
of per111anent income or wealth rather than current "work to be done" or
transactions needs.

This suggests permanent disposable income as a scale

variable, not current disposable income, except to the extent that current
realizations are a good proxy for unobservable permanent values.
Algebraically, the Mankiw-Sutnmers theory simply involves the substi
tution of (24') for (24)
(24')

=

M

p

tr ( O; ty

d

> O; o < tw < 1

It is clear that, since a tax cut shifts the IS curve to the right and
the LM curve to the left, the net effect on output is qualitatively
ambiguous. ]ii

The interest rate of course rises unambiguously.

A

strong effect of disposable income on money demand and a strong response
of investment to the rate of interest make a negative multiplier more
likely, a higher marginal propensity to consume and interest sensitivity
of money demand make it less likely. 40/
always equals unity.

The balanced budget multiplier
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In an open economy with a freely floating exchange rate and perfect
capital mobility, fiscal policy cannot affect the level of output.

A tax

cut boosts private consumption (or investment) and crowds out the current
account surplus through an appreciation of the nominal and real exchange
The IS curve ( 23) is replaced by ( 23').

rate.

X denotes the trade

balance surplus, e the nominal exchange rate, r* the exogenous world
interest rate, and p* the exogenous world price level.

(23')

C(Yd, W) + I(r) + G + x(ep*)

(28)

r

p

b.

=

=

y

X'

>0

r*

Old-Fashioned Clas.sical Short-Run Crowding Out
In a closed economy setting, classical crowding out refers to

the inevitability of public spending crowding out private spending or of
tax cuts crowding out one category of private spending at the expense of
another when resources are utilized fully.

In the simplest version,

perfect wage and price flexibility produce a vertical aggregate supply
schedule.

If the "full employment" level of employment and output is

independent of tax rates and public spending, 100 percent crowding out is
inevitable, regardless of the government's monetary policy.

While in a

Keynesian setting ,crowing out can always be viewed as evidence of badly
managed monetary policy (or perhaps more fairly as evidence of insuffi
cient coordination of monetary and fiscal policy) this is not true at
full employment.

Any boost to demand will raise wages and prices but

leave output and employment unchanged.

The incentive, or allocative
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effects of tax cuts and spending increases may of course alter labour
supply or demand and thus alter the full-employment level of output and
employment even in the short run.

In the open economy versions (equa

tions (23'), and (24)-(28), with Y = Y and p flexible), expansionary
fiscal policy again cannot affect global (domestic and foreign) demand
for home goods.

The price level will remain constant (just as the level

of output remained unchanged in the Keynesian regime) and the exchange
rate will appreciate to crowd out the current account surplus.

Inter

mediate regimes with an upward-sloping aggregate supply schedule give
outcomes that, not surprisingly, lie between the pure Keynesian and pure
classical regimes.
c.

Old-FMhioned Ke:p_tesian :Long-Run Cro"vTding Out
The recognition that bond-financed public sector deficits imply

a cumulative gro"vTth of the outstanding stock of debt and that this
"intrinsic" dynamic would shift the LM and IS curves, if wealth effects
on money demand and consumption demand are present and if government debt
is perceived as net worth at least to some extent, generated the "govern
ment budget constraint literature" (Christ [1968], Blinder and Solow
[1973], Tobin and Buiter [1976]).

The simplest models ignored asset

accumulation other than through public sector deficits (e.g., private
capital accumulation and foreign wealth dynamics through the current
account of the balance of payments).

The Keynesian version continued to

treat the price level as given and output as determined by effective
demand.

The government budget identity (29) augments the closed economy

model of equations (22) to (27).
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. .

(29)

M+B
p

G

+ ~p -

T

Consider the case of bond-financed deficits

(M

=

0).

Regardless of

the nature of the fiscal policy action (or other exogenous shocks) that
causes a deficit or surplus, as long as the deficit (surplus) persists,
the IS curve will be shifting to the right (if Cw> 0) and the LM curve
to the left (if iw > 0).

Solving the IS and LM equations for rand Y

as functions of B, M; and the fiscal parameters, we get the short-run
reduced form or IS-LM solutions for rand Y:

HM< 0; HB

(30a)

> 0; He < 0, i=l,2,3; HG> 0
i

(30b)

Substituting this into the budget identity and linearizing around a long
run stationary equilibrium, we find that the model will be stable if

Left to themselves, deficits feed on themselves.

First consider the

case where taxes and transfer payments do not adjust to changes in the debt
service component of the budget (82 = 0).
is now easily interpreted.
given interest rate (r
debt (HBB

> 0).

> 0)

The stability condition (31)

Higher debt means higher debt service at any
and a higher interest rate for any level of

Only if debt issues, through a strong wealth effect on

consumption (Cw>> 0) raise the tax base (Y) by enough to raise income
related taxes (81Y) by more than the total increase in interest costs, can
this economy ever settle down in a balanced budget equilibrium after a
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disturbance.

Explosive debt growth is certainly possible with this

particular (and perhaps rather implausible) specification of the fiscal
policy rule:

fixed values of G, 60, 61, and 62 with 62 = O.

Stability or instability is, however, a function both of the para
meters describing the behavior of the private economy and of the para
meters describing government behavior.

If, e.g., the authorities had a

fiscal decision rule which raised taxes (lowered transfer payments)
whenever r(B/P) increased, stability would become much more likely.
a positive short-run effect of bonds on output (FB
will stabilize the debt-deficit process.

> 0),

Even if FB

<

With

a value of 82

<1

O, there exists a

value of 82 (greater than 1 in this case), which will smother the debt
explosion. !::1,_/

There are many alternative debt-stabilizing tax-transfer

functions, and the addition of exhaustive public spending G to the
arsenal of potential debt-stabilizing instruments only reinforces the
conclusion that an explosive debt-deficit spiral is a policy choice rather
than a deep structural property of the economy.
One can check that, with 62 = O, if the inodel is siable, a bond
financed tax cut has a stronger expansionary effect on output in the long
run than a money-financed tax cut. 42/

I don't consider this result, due

to Blinder and Solow, to have much policy relevance.

It amounts to a

restatement of the (very strict) stability conditions for this model
under the given specification of the public spending and revenue functions.

If this model is to be stable under bond financing, then endogenous
income-related tax revenues must outstrip the explosive intrinsic debt
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dynamics.

This can only happen if a larger stock of bonds raises demand

(and thus output) to such an extent that tax revenues grow faster than
debt service.
The major weakness of this class of models is that the significance
of a dynamic analysis (and a comparison of stationary equilibria) which
extends into the long run the assumptions of nominal wage and/or price
rigidity and demand-constrained output of the sho.rt-run Keynesian model,
is not too apparent.

A further problem has been that the focus on fixed

price, zero-trend real growth models has at times led to the identifica
tion of stationary equilibria with balanced budget equilibria.

Stationary

equilibria are more generally characterized by stationary stock-flow and
stockstock ratios.

Nominal asset stocks can grow (shrink) at the sum

of the growth rates of the general price level and the level of capacity
output.

These shortcomings have been rectified in a number of places

(e.g., Buiter [1979]) by adding some version of an augmented Phillips
curve to the Blinder-Solow model and thus combining short-run nominal
rigidity with long run nominal wage and price flexibility.
It should be intuitively obvious that adding an exogenous capacity
constraint or full-employment output constraint to the IS-LM-government
budget constraint model, worsens the prospects for stability under the
usual specification of the taxation and public spending functions.

The

reason is that the tax base (the exogenous level of real income) cannot
expand in the long run to offset the effect of higher interest payments
on the deficit.

Stability can now be achieved only if a larger stock of
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debt raises the general price level by enough to lower the real value of
debt interest payments r(B/P) even though their nominal value increases. 43/
If full-employment output is endogenous in the long run, say through
private capital formation, prospects for stability under the given tax
transfer and spending rules are even dimmer.

This is because debt-financ

ing almost certainly raises short- and long-term real interest rates and,
except in a Keynesian demand-constrained regime, lowers Tobin's "marginal
q" and thus the incentive to invest.

There will be downward pressure on

the tax base through this channel and thus a greater likelihood of debt
deficit instability.

The lasting insight from the government budget

constraint literature is that it made it very clear that questions such
as ••what is the effect on output of an increase in public spending by an
amount x," are badly (because incompletely) worded.

One must specify

both the U.nancing mode and the run (impact, steady-state or "real time•·
over some given horizon) to which the question applies.

Answers take the

form.of a financing mode-contingent sequence of dynamic multipliers.
The open economy versions of the Keynesian budget constraint literature
(see e.g., Branson [1975], [1976), and HIE(2) [1985]) added much that is
of interest, but for our purposes the essentials of debt-dynamics in
Keynesian models are represented adequately _by the closed economy models.
Rather than spending any time on old-fashioned classical long-run crowding
out (see e.g., Buiter [1979] and Tobin [1976]), the important insights of
the classical perspective will be discussed within a rational expectations
setting.
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d.

Portfolio Crowding Out
Tobin (1961, 1969] extended the Keynesian two-asset (money

banks) model with its implicit assumption of perfect substitutability in
private portfolios between bonds and claims on capital to a general three
asset (money-bank-capital) model.

The effect on investment of an increase

in the stock of debt will depend on the relative degrees of substitutability
of bonds vis-a-vis money and bonds vis-avis capital.

When bonds and

capital are closer substitutes, art increase in debt will raise the required
rate of return oil capi:tal along with the interest rate.

When bonds and

money are closer substitutes, an increase in debt will lower the·required
rate of return in capital although the interest rate will still rise.
Friedman [ 1985] and Frenkel [ 1983] have provided empirical evidence,
using U.S. data and a capital-asset pricing version of the money-bonds
model, on the effect of changes in the stock of debt on the yield differ
entials between bonds and capital.

In general, these will be a function

of asset supplies, the degree of risk a'\>'ersion, and the perceived correla
tion of asset returns.

Frenkel finds negligible effects of relative

asset supplies on yield premia.

Friedman finds statistically significant

and small but non-negligible effects.

Their evidence, however, relates

to the relative required rates of return on bonds and capital.

The

effect of debt onthe overall level of rates of return is not analyzed.
A zero effect of realtive asset supplies on the bond-capital return
differential (the traditional Keynesian perfect-substitutes case) is of
course quite consistent with a strong crowding out effect of debt through
the level of common required rate of return on bonds and capital.
also Friedman [1984] and Vance Roley [1983].)

[See
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e.

Rational Expectations-Augmented Keynesian Crowding Out
Within the Keynesian tradition, the incorporation of forward

looking rational expectations of endogenous variables has made an impor
tant contribution to our understanding of the effects of fiscal policy on
aggregate demand.

lntertemporal speculation or arbitrage entered the

Keynesian models in two ways.

First, in closed economy models, through

an arbitrage condition linking short and long interest rates (or short
interest rates and a stock market-index) and second, in open economy
models, through an arbitrage condition linking the exchange rate and
domestic-foreign interest differentials.

Not only must the financing

mode and the run be specified before an answer to any question concerning
the effects of tax or spending changes can be given, but the manner in
which information about the policy instruments (and about all other
~11:ogenous "fundalilentals") accrues to and is absorbed by private agents
must be detailed.

Inthe certainty-equivalent world inhabited by most

linear or log-linear rational expectations macro-models (where expectations
can be viewed as being held with complete subjective certainty), the
model cannot be solved unless one knows whether the behaviour of the
exogenous variable (s) is:

(a) unanticipated or anticipated (and if the

latter, when); and, (b) perceived as permanent, transitory, or rever
sible. 44/

The structure of the model and the current, past, and expected

future values of the exogenous varibles determine the current behaviour
of the economy.

It is impossible to study the short-run behaviour of the

model without at the same time and as part of the same exercise, solving
for the entire future (expected) behaviour of the model, including its
long-run steady-state properties.
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The easiest way to see what this implies for the crowding out debate
is to modify the IS function in the model of equations (23) to (27) in
the spirit of Blanchard [1981] as follows:
( 23")

C( Yd , W) + I( R) + G

=

I'

Y

<0

Investment depends inversely on the long interest rate, R.
money depends inversely on the short interest rate.

The demand for

The long and short

rates are linked by assuming that the expectations hypothesis of the term
structure holds:

.

( 32)

r

=

ER

R- -

R

In this model, the effect of an unanticipate d, immediate and permanent
cut in taxes (or increase in spending) is the same as it is in the simplest
Keynesian model where the short rate enters both the money demand function
and the investment function.
included.)

(Note that debt-defici t dynamics are not

What is different is that in this model the impact effect of

the unexpected announcemen t (at to) of a future expansionary fiscal policy
move (a cut in taxes or increase in spending at t1
ary.

The intuition is clear.

> to)

is contraction 

Between the announcemen t date (to) and the

implementat ion date (t1) there is not yet any direct stimulus to demand
from higher spending or lower taxes.

Investors in financial markets do,

however, take into account the future outward shift of the IS curve (after
t1)•

Short-term interest rates are therefore expected to be higher after

t1, when the fiscal boost gets under way.
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The current long rate (R(to) can be viewed as a forward-looking
moving average of future expected short rates. 44/

At the announcement

date, to, therefore, the long rate increases in line with the higher
expected future short rates.

This will shift the IS curve to the left

in (r-Y) space, lowering output and the short rate of interest.

The

behaviour of taxes, output, and of long and short rates is sketched
below in Figure 7.

The main point is that the announcement effect of an

anticipated futut'e fiscal expansion will result in a negative impact
multiplier.

When the fiscal stimulus finally occurs at t1, output will

of course rise in the manner indicated by the traditional short run

IS-LM model.
A role very similar to that played by the long rate of interest

in the closed economy model is played by the (real) exchange rate in the
rational expectations version of the open economy model with perfect
capital mobility and a freely floating exchange rate.
the open economy IS curve (23').

As

before, we use

Equation (28) is now, however, replaced

by the uncovered interest parity condition:

(28')
The nominal exchange rate at time tis therefore given by the 'long run
equilibrium exchange rate times the exponent of the integral (sum) of all
future expected foreign-domestic nominal interest differentials: 45/
en*
The real exchange rate, c =~,can
p
.also be seen to be given by the
long-run equilibrium real exchange rate times the exponent of the integral (sum) of all future expected foreign-domestic real interest differ
entials. 46/
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A fiscal expansion which is immediate, permanent, and unanticipated
raises all current and expected future domestic interest rates; given
foreign interest rates, the nominal exchange rate will "jump" appreciate:
e falls.

Given r* and the domestic and foreign price levels, the real

exchange also jump-appreciate s.
there will be full crowding out:

In this case, it is easily checked that
output does not increase as the fiscal

stimulus is negated by a loss of competitiveness .

An anticipated future

fiscal expansion will be contractionary as the exchange_rate appreciates,
because of the expectation of future higher domestic interest rates,
before the demand stimulus from the fiscal expansion occurs.
Both these examples of negative fiscal announcement impact multi
pliers have nothing to do with deficits per se.

They would occur even if

the fiscal stimulus were of the balanced-budget variety ·and indeed as a
result of any anticipated private or public, domestic or foreign shock .
To highlight the role of

that shifts future IS curves to the right.

deficits in a rational expectations setting, we revert to the closed
economy model with long and short interest rates, and the budget con
straint.
(23")

C( Y +

( 24)

£( r,

( 33)

r!p - T,
y, M+B)
p

.p

r - Et·p

M+B) + I( R) + G

p

=

M
p

.

=

R
R - EtR

=

Y
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. .

M+B

(29)

.

p
p

(34)

B

G+r=-T
p

=

p

=

ijJ(y -

y)

+ JJ

The price lvel is predeterm ined, i.e., given at a point in time, and
output is demand-de termined.

Over time, however, the price level adjusts

to excess demand or supply according to an augmented Phillips curve.
Full employment output is exogenous .

The long.!!:.!!. interest rate (R) is

linked to the short real rate, r - P/P, through the expectatio ns hypothesi s
(equation (33)).

To keep the dynamic analysis simple, I assume that the

governmen t uses a combinatio n of money financing and bond financing which
keeps the shares of money and bonds in total governmen t debt (a and 1-a
respectiv ely) constant, i.e.,
(35a)

M

=

ab

(35b)

B

=

(1-a)A

(35c)

A

=

M

+

B

The augmentat ion term in the price-Phi llips curve (equation (34))
is the policy-de termined proportio nal rate of growth of total nominal
governmen t liabilitie s.
(35d)

JJ

The specifica tion of the monetary -fiscal-fin ancial decision rules in
this example is:
determine d.

exogenous G, a andµ.

Taxes are therefore endogenou sly

An increase in JJ, given G, can only be brought about by a
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tax cut.

Leto= ~/p, the real stock of money plus bonds.

r = H(R, o;G

µ, a) and y = F(R, o~ G, µ, a) are again the IS-LM solutions for

randy.
In the neighborhood of a steady-state equilibrium

R, 6,

the behavior

of this economy can be described by equation (36) •

.

R

R(l-HR

+

1j,FR)

-R(Ho - 1j,Fo)

=

(36)
•

0

-1j,FR

I

-1j,Fo

-R(Hc; - 1jl FG)

R(l-Hµ

-ij,FG

-1j,Fµ

[:

+

+ 1j!Fµ)

If government debt is net wealth, the IS curve shifts to the right
in r-y space when o increases.

(Note that since investment depends on R

and not on r, the IS curve is vertical in r-y space.)
increases the demand for money (if R.w
curve to the left.

> O)

o also

which tends to shift the LM

A fraction a of the increase in the government's

liabilities is in the form of money issues.
curve to the right.

An increase in

Thus, while F0

> O,

This lends to shift the LM

an increase in o will raise

the short interest rate, r, if a is small (in a high-debt economy) but
lowers it if a is sufficiently large (a low-debt economy),£! i.e., H
0
will be positive for small a and negative for large a.

For reasons of

space, only the high-debt economy is considered in what follows.

The

system described in (36) has one predetermined state variable o and one

- 77 -

non-predetermined one, R.

For there to exist a unique convergent saddle

point equilibrium, it is necessary and sufficient that F0 (1-HR) +
FRiio

> O.

In the low-debt economy (which behaves more or less like an

economy under pure money financed deficits) this condition is always satisfied.
In the high-debt, low a economy, which behaves approximately like an
economy under pure bond financing, explosive behavior cannot be ruled out
a priori.

If there exists a convergent saddlepoint equilibrium, it is

likely to have the configuration shown in Figure 8, with an upward-slopoing
saddlepoint SS'. 49/
The long-run effect of an increase inµ is a larger real volume of
total government debt (o increases) and a higher R (and r).

221

An

unexpected, immediate and permanent increase inµ (which implies a short
run and long-run tax cut) causes the long real interest rate to jump
immediately from Eo to Eo1, onto S1S1, the convergent saddlepath through
the new long-run equilibrium at E1.

There will, however, be a recession

during the entire adjustment process.

We know this because the real

stock of government liabilities rises throughout the adjustment process.
This can only happen if the rate of inflation is below the nominal rate
of growth of these liabilitiesµ.
that this requires y

< y.

From the Phillips curve it is clear

It is therefore not impossible to come up with

examples in which even immediately implemented "expansionary" fiscal
policy (e.g., a permanent tax cut) will have a depressing effect on real
economic activity because the anticipated future deficits and the bias
towards bond financing (low a) raise the long real interest rate by
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Figure 8.
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- 79 -

enough to induce more than 100 percent crowding out of private interest
sensitive spending in the short run and throughout the adjustment process.
Because capacity output is exogenous, crowding out aross steady states
is of course 100 percent.
Other ways of generating a negative impact-demand multiplier is
through confidence effects.

If private agents are unsure about the

sustainability of the government's fiscal policy stance, and more speci
0

fically, if there is some probability of explosive debt accumulation, and
eventual repudiation, a risk premium will be added, both to short and long
interest rates.

Formally, this works pretty much like an increase in R

in the previous two models.
There is little, if any, direct or indirect evidence on the likelihood
of negative mulitpliers in the circumstances faced by the major industrialized
nations today. ·
f.

Rational Expectations -- Augmented Classical Crowding
Out and the Imeossibility of Cutting Taxes
This is a suitable point to bring out one of the consequences of

the government having to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint.
Given the real exhaustive spending programme, and given the revenues from
future seigniorage, a tax cut today requires, on average, a tax increase
tomorrow if the government is to satisfy its solvency constraint.

We

should therefore talk of an intertemporal reallocation or redistribution
of taxes and transfer payments.
government budget identity.

Consider the following very simple

There is no money, one real short government

bond, B, public spending G, and taxes net of transfers T.
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( 37)

.

B(t)

G(t) + rS(t)B(t) - T(t)

The solvency constraint is
T

-1 rS(u)du
lim B( T) e t

=

O

T+<X>

or
(38)

B(t) + Pl/(G, t, rS)

B(t) is inherited from the past.

Pl/( T, t, rS)

Pl/(G, t, rS) is not automatically given

when the entire current and future path of G is given, because current
and expected future real interest rates need not be invariant under the
changes in fiscal policy that are being considered.

The simplest case

is the small open economy whose external terms of trade are exogenous
and constant and whose internal rate of interest is determined exclusively
by the exogenously given world rate of interest r*.

W

This makes

Pl/(G, t, rS) independent of any changes in the policy mix.

The authori

ties merely reshuffle a given present discounted value of taxes over time.
A current tax cut must imply a future tax increase of equal present value.
That is not to say that such a reallocation of taxes towards the future
will have no effects.

In a classical, rational expectations model such

as Blanchard's [1985), uncertain lifetimes cause the private sector to
discount future income and taxes at a rate higher than the government's
discount rate, rs.

A sequence of early tax cuts followed by a later

tax increase of equal present value when discounted at rs, will represent
a net reduction in the present value of current and future taxes when
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discounted at the higher rate rs - \

where A > O is the premium of the

private discount rate over the government's discount rate. 52/

This

boost to private sector human capital will have the familiar result of
boosting consumption, lowering private saving in the short run, reducing
the current account surplus, and reducing private non-human wealth in
the long run.

In the small open economy, the capital-output ratio is

held in place by the world interest rate, and long-run crowding out
takes the form of a reduction in the country's financial claims on the
rest of the world.
In a closed economy or an open economy large enough to influence the
terms of trade or the world interest rate, the path of rs will be a
function of the government's financing policy.

In Blanchard [1984, 1985]

and Buiter [1984] it is shown that it is still true that an early tax cut
requires a later tax increase (if the public spending programme is held
constant) or a later exhaustive spending cut (if the tax-transfer programme
is held constant except for the early cuts).

The real interest rate rises

immediately and stays high even when in due course the tax cuts are
reversed.

The reason is that in the meantime, a sequence of government

budget deficits has added to the total outstanding stock of debt, which
keeps interest rates high at home and abroad.

Investment declines at

home and abroad in the short run and in the long run the capital intensity
of production is lowered.

Domestic public debt thus crowds out capital

formation at home and abroad.

It also results in a domestic current

account deficit and a long-run reduction in the home country's net
external asset position. 53/
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At the risk of stating the obvious, I would like to pont out a
pitfall in the interpretation of steady-state analysis.
constant in the steady state.

Let G and T be

Assume for simplicity that the long-run

growth rate of real output is zero.

The long-run or steady-state govern

ment budget identity is
(39)

B

=

Assume rs> O.

T - G

rs
Equation (39) appears to suggest that the way to reduce

the outstanding stock of government debt in the long run is to cut taxes
or raise public spending.

This of course is nonsense.

Consider the case

where rs is constant and tax receipts do not respond to variations in
economic activity.

It is clear that the bud.get identity (37) describes

unstable, explosive behaviour of the public debt.

A tax cut implies

higher borrowing in the short run and therefore higher de,bt and increased
debt service and yet higher borrowing in the long run.

The correct inter

pretation of (39) is that if a country wishes to have lower taxes (or
higher exhaustive public spending) in the long run, it will have to reduce
its debt service burden.

In a small open economy, this means that the

country has to achieve a transition to a lower stock of debt.

(In a

closed economy or a large open economy, the reduction in debt service
could be eased by achieving a lower interest rate in addition to a
lower debt volume).

Given G, the "traverse" from a high value of B to a

low value of B will be achieved by tax increases, generating budget
surpluses that, over time, permit a lower value of debt service.

Only

then can taxes be cut to achieve a long-run equilibrium with a lower
volume of debt and a lower value of taxes.
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The same caution in interpreting steady-state multipliers is required
when one considers the long-run net foreign asset position of a country.
The current account identity is given in (40).
is given in (41).
r*

Its steady-state version

F denotes net claims on the rest of the world (yielding

> 0) •

.

(40)

F

Y + r*F - (C +I+ G)

(41)

F

C+I+G-Y
r*

Equation (41) could be misinterpre ted as indicating that in order to
increase one's long-run holdings of net foreign assets, one should boost
'
absorption (C +I+
G) relative to income.

What it means instead is

that if a country wishes to increase its long-run absorption relative to
its domestic income, it should acquire foreign assets.

In real time,

the process of foreign investment requires a lowering of real absorption
relative to domestic income.
There are two qualificatio ns to these results concerning the inter
temporal reallocation of taxes (of primary surpluses more generally).
First, the models of Blanchard [1984, 1985), Buiter [1984), and Frenkel
and Razin [1984) are full employment models.

The cost-benefi t analysis

of an intertempor al tax reallocation programme may be very different if
the initial situation is one of Keynesian unemployment, as it is then
possible, in principle, to boost private consumption in the short run
without this requiring the crowding out either of private domestic capital
formation or of net foreign investment, as domestic output is demand
constrained .
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Second, real world taxes are not lump-sum but typically take the
form of a tax rate (or schedule of rates) applied to a tax base such as
value added, wages, profits, or sales revenue.

Consider again the simplest

case where tax receipts are an linear function of value added, Y. For
example,

While it is still true that (given spending) a cut in total taxes
(T) now requires an increase in total taxes later, it is not necessarily
the case that a cut now in either 60 or 61 will require a future increase
in either 60 or 61.

-

The tax base, Y, could increase sufficiently as a

result of the early tax rate cut (or incrase in thresholds) to permit
the higher required future taxes to be raised at an unchanged (and con
ceivably even lower) tax rate and an unchanged (or higher) threshold.
The contributions of Blinder and Solow [1973], and Tobin and Bulter
[1976], discussed earlier, analyzed this possibility in a Keynesian
fixed-price setting, ~/ and in the case of Tobin and Bulter, in a full
employment, flexible price setting.

No stable Keynesian model that I know,

however, has the property that a cut in 60 or 61 will boost output on
impact to such an extent that total tax receipts actually increase and
deficits fall in the short run.

That feat, as we saw, can only be

achieved in the long run if the positive wealth effect on consumption
demand of a larger stock of public debt outweighs the effect on money
demand by enough to generate an increase in taxable income that is
sufficient to service the increase in debt at the new lower tax rates.
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The classical version of the Keynesian super-multiplier is the Laffer
effect; lower tax rates lead to a reduction in distortions and misalloca
tions and boost incentives to work, save, invest, and innovate to such an
extent that "full employment" output increases by enough to generate increased
tax revenues at a lower tax rate.

I know of no empirical evidence to

support the proposition that (the absolute value of) the elasticity of
the tax base with respect to the tax rate is greater than unity.

It goes

without saying that even without the extreme versions of the Keynesian
demand multiplier and Laffer's supply multiplier being relevant, careful
attention to both the demand-(de)stabilizing properties and the (mis)
allocative effects of tax changes is essential for economic policy design.
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6.

Measures of Fiscal Stance
The discussion of Section 5 should have made it clear that in order

to obtain a measure of the effect of the stance of fiscal policy on aggre
gate demand, one needs:

(a) a model of the economy; and (b) a benchmark

or reference specification for policy.

As regards the first, I can

only restate the conclusion reached by Blinder and Solow [1974] that
there are no "model-free" measures of fiscal impact on aggregate demand.
Different views on how the economy works will give rise to conclusions
about the demand effect on fiscal policy measures (whether they be isolated
changes in the values of certain instruments or changes in the parameters
describing fiscal and financial decision rules) that may differ not only
in magnitude but even in direction.
path is equally obvious.

The need for a benchmark or reference

"Expansionary (or contractionary) relative to

what?" should the immediate response be to the question as to whether
the stance of fiscal policy is expansionary or contra:ctionary.

If total

tax receipts increase, is this a discretionary move to tighten fiscal
policy (the reference point is the pre-existing level of taxes) or the
automatic resonse of tax receipts to endogenous fluctuations in economic
activity, according to an unchanged tax rule such as T = 80 + 81Y, 81
(the benchmark is the original parameters of the tax function).

As long

as one is explicit about the benchmark reference path or "origin" for
one's comparison, there should be no confusion on this account.
Certain conclusions about much-abused fiscal indicators are worth
stating explicitly:

>0
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1)

There is no existing model of the economy that yields the public
sector deficit, the change in the public sector deficit, its
share in GDP or the change in its share in GDP as a measure of
fiscal impact on demand, short-run, long-run, or real-time.

2)

There is no existing model of the economy that yields the
cyclically corrected (full employment) deficit, the change in
this deficit, its share in GDP or the change in its share in GDP
as a measure of fiscal impact on aggregate demand in any run.

3)

There is no existing model of the economy that yields the
cyclically and inflation-corrected deficit (its change, share in
GDP or change in its share in GDP) as a measure of fiscal impact
on aggregate demand in any run.
From (2) and (3) it follows e.g., that both the OECD's and
the IMF's fiscal impulse measures are uninformative as measures
- of fiscal impact on demand ( see IMF [ 1 985 l and OECD [ 1982, 1985]) •

4)

There is no existing model of the economy that yields the level
or change in the debt-GDP ratio as a measure of fiscal impact on
aggregate demand in any run.

What would a proper measure of fiscal impact on aggregate demand look
like?

Basically, it involves a comparison of two simulations (or two

sets of stochastic simulations) of an economic model with different sets
of parameter values in certain fiscal and financial decision rules.
Sometimes, with very simple models, this can be done analytically.

In

the old-fashioned static, expectations-innocent, closed-economy Keynesian
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model of equations (23) - (27) with the specific benchmark policy G = G
(exogenous) and T = 61 + 61Y, the (impact) effect on aggregate demand
of fiscal policy given an accommodating monetary policy (r constant) is
(42a)

dy

(42b)

K

=

K[dG - Cy d6o - Cy Yd61]
d

d

1

=

The (impact) effect of fiscal policy on aggregate demand under a
non-accommodating monetary policy (M constant) for this model is:
(43a)
(43b)
Notice that the fiscal parameters dG, d6o, and d61 are multiplier
weighted and that these weights are evaluated at the actual (not necessarily
the cyclically-corrected) level of output:
Contrast (42ab) and (43ab) with the measure of fiscal impact that
comes out of Blanchard's classical model with rational expectations and
uncertain lifetimes (Blanchard [1985]).
The effect of public spending on goods and services and lump-sum
taxes on consumption demand (at given current and expected future interest
rates) denoted f(t) is given by:
s
m

(44)

f(t)

=

f

G(t) - (A+ p)Et

-f (r(u)+A)du
G(z)e t
ds +

t
s
m

(A+p)(B(t) + Et

f
t

-f (r(u)+A)du
(G(s) - T(s))e t
ds)

- 89 -

A is the instantaneous probability of death,

P

the private sector's rate

of time preference and B(t) the outstanding real shock of interest-bearin g
debt.

The first two terms on the right-hand-side of (44) give the effect

of balanced-budget (tax-financed) exhaustive spending.

Spending on goods

and services by the government only boosts demand if current spending
exceeds its "permanent" or average future expected value.
e.g., a constant level of spending has no effect on demand.

When

P =

r,

The third

term on the right-hand-side of (44) is zero i f private decision horizons
are infinite (A= 0).

It is positive if horizons are finite (A> 0).

This presents the effect of debt-financing.

Bonds are "wealth" i f A > 0

and consumption demand is ,an increasing function of the outstanding
stock of bonds.

Note how in (44), unlike in (42a) and (42b), expectations

of future spending, taxes, and interest rates must be modelled to obtain
the current demand effect of fiscal and financial policy.
While these two illustrative fiscal stance measures are at opposite
ends of the modeling universe, they do convey the right flavour of the
range of views on the fiscal stance that different economists (or even
the same economist at different times) can hold.
It is informative to look at some of the indices that have been
(ab)used as measures of fiscal stance.

Figure 9a graphs five measures

of fiscal stance for the United States and Figure 9b does the same for
the United Kingdom.

For both countries the change in the actual general

government financial deficit as a percentage of GNP is shown and two
measures of the change in the cyclically-corr ected (full employment or
structural) deficit as a percentage of GNP, one constructed and published

FIGURE 9b
Five _general government fiscal impu_l_se measures: UK •
(Change in (adjusted) deficit as a percentage of actual or potential GNP).
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Five general government fiscal impulse measures:USA.
(Change in (adjusted) deficit as a percentage of actual or potential GNP).
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by the IMF and one by the OECD.

Also for both countries we have the

change in the inflation-corrected and cyclically-adjusted general govern
ment financial deficit as a percentage of GNP.

Finally, for the United

States, there is a short run of figures giving an estimate of the change
in Blanchard's measure of fiscal stance in equation (44) and for the
United Kingdom there is a set of NIESR estimates of the change in "demand
weighted," cyclically-corrected deficit measure.

The latter represents

an attempt to estimate the impact 55/ effect of discretionary fiscal
changes on the demand for currently produced domestic coutput in a simple
Keynesian world.
The summary statistics provided in Tables 6, 7, and 8 show that the
different indices tell quite different stories.

For the United States,

over the brief period for which all five measures are available (1978-84),
the divergence between the various indices is smallest.

Even here, the

mean change in the deficit as a percentag.e of GNP lies between 0. 36 for
the actual deficit and 0.O0 for Blanchard's measure.

The standard devia

tion of the actual deficit change is about twice that of the other measures.
The measures are all positively correlated, but the correlation ranges
from a high of 0.88 (between Blanchard's measure and the IMF's cyclically
corrected measure) to a low of 0.58 between the IMF's cyclically-corrected
deficit measure and the actual deficit.

Considering three of the measures

for the United States over a longer period (1972-84) in Table 7, we see
that while the actual deficit measure is both larger on average and more
volatile than the two cyclically-corrected measures, the three are rather
highly correlated.
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Table 6. The Behavior of Five Indices of Fiscal
Stance in the United States, 1978-84 1/

Variables

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Actual

O. 36

1.46

Cyclicall y-correct ed
(OECD)

0.14

o. 7 0

0.33

a. 61

Inflation and cyclically
corrected (0ECD)

0.16

o. 88

Blanchard

O. 00

0.88

Cyclicall y-correct ed
( IMF)

lJ Change in ( corrected ) deficit as a per-centage of actual or potential GNP.
Correlatio n Matrix
Actual

1. 00

Cyclicall y
corrected
(OECD)

o. 78

1.00

o. 58

o. 86

1. 00

Inflation and
cyclicall y
corrected (OECD)

o. 83

o. 86

o. 76

1. 00

Blanchard

o. 72

o. 84

0. 88

o. 64

Cyclicall y
corrected
( IMF)

1. 00
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Table 7. The Behavior of Three Indices of
Fiscal Stance in the United States, 1972-84

Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Actual

0.12

1. 79

Cyclically-corrected
(0ECD)

-. 008

0.81

Inflation and
cyclicallycorrected ( 0ECD)

-. 02

1. 00

Correlation Matrix
Actual

1.00

Cyclically
corrected
(OECD)

o. 78

1. 00

o. 70

o. 87

Inflation and
cyclically
correced
(0ECD)

1. 00
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Table 8. The Behavior of Five Indices of Fiscal
Stance in the United Kingdom, 1973-84 1/

Variable

Mean

Actual

O. 18

Cyclically corrected
( OECD)

Standard
Deviation

-0. 23

1.74

-0. 01

1. 61

Inflation and
cyclically
corrected ( OECD)

-0. 05

2. 93

Demand-weig hted,
cyclicallycorrected (NIBSR)

-0.21

1. 15

Cyclically corrected
( IMF)

11 Change in ( corrected) deficit as a
percentage of actual or potential GNP.
Correlation Matrix
Actual

1. 00

Cyclically
corrected (OECD)

0.75

1. 00

Cyclically
corrected ( IMF)

o. 69

o. 99

1. 00

Inflation and
cyclically
corrected (OECD)

o. 39

o. 65

o. 64

1. 00

Demand-weig hted,
cyclically
corrected (NIBSR)

o. 64

o. 65

o. 69

o. 09

1. 00
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For the United Kingdom (Table 8), the five measures behave very
differently over the period 1973-84.

The mean change in the deficit as

a percentage of GDP ranges from 0.18 for the actual deficit to -0.23 for
the OECD's cyclically-corrected measure.

The change in the actual deficit

is the least volatile of the five measures while for the United States it
was the most volatile.

The wildest swings are exhibited by the inflation

and cyclically-corrected deficit measure of the OECD because of the great
volatility of ex-post U.K. annual inflation rates over the period.

The

IMF's and the OECD's cyclically-corrected measures are almost perfectly
positively correlated.

Very low correlations are recorded for the actual

deficit and the inflation and cyclically-corrected deficit (0.39) and for
the demand-weighted cycUcally-corrected deficit and the inflation and
cyclically-corrected deficit (0.09).
Incorrect measures may sometimes give the right answer:

the man who

always insists it's twelve o'clock will be correct twice a day.

Blanchard's

measure and the NIESR's measure have the virtue of being model-based.
Those who like the model must like the measure; those who disagree can be
explicit and precise about the nature of the disagreement and so arrive at
their own preferred model-based measure.

All the other measures do not

have interpretations as indices of the impact of fiscal policy on aggregate
demand.

Some (e.g., a superior version of the cyclically- and inflation

corrected deficit) may be crude approximations to one of the "permanent
deficit" or solvency measures.
In general, the information required to obtain a measure of fiscal
impact on demand consists of the following:
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1)

A

model of the economy (one hopes for one that respects stock

flow identities and treats expectations seriously).
2)

A specification of the length of the run over which one wishes
to measure the impact of fiscal policy.

3)

A full specification of the benchmark and the alternative
policies.
a)

This includes the following:

How fiscal policy is parameterized (the tax and spending
functions)

b)

How monetary and financial policy are parameterized. (1s
monetary policy fully accommodating, non-accommodat ing, or
something in between?

4)

What is the exchange rate rule? etc.

A full specification of how information about the changes in
fiscal and fi.nanc:lal policy actions or rules is disseminated to
and processed by the private sector.

This includes at least a

characterizatio n of the unanticipated-a nticipated, current
future, and permanent-trans itory aspects of the policy change.
All this is hard work.
debate.

It is also essential for informed policy

It is possible that there are reasonable shortcuts, but we

won't know this until we have first obtained the results from following
the correct procedures, which can then be compared with the answers
suggested by seat-of-the-pan ts methods.
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7.

Conclusion
Probably more uninformed statements have been made on the issue of

public sector debt and deficits than over any other topic in macroeconom ics.
Proof by repeated assertion has frequently appeared to be an acceptable
substitute for the more conventiona l methods of proof by deduction or by
induction.

The public debt in the long run, and (except under some

rather special parameteriz ations of fiscal and financial policy) the
public sector deficit in the long run and in the short run are endogenousl y
determined by the interaction of the economic system and the government' s
policy rules.

As

with all predetermine d or endogenous variables, observa

tions on public sector debt and deficits contain information about the
current state and future evolution of the economy, i.e.~ they are signals
from which the careful practioner can extract information.

The practical

problem is that (changes in) debt and deficits can signal almost anything,
depending on the nature of the exogenous shocks perturbing the system and
on the structure of the rest of the transmission mechanism.

A larger

deficit may signal a loosening of fiscal policy or a tightening of fiscal
policy (without which the deficit would have been even larger) in response
to a fall in export demand or a collapse in domestic animal spirits.

A

larger deficit could also reflect a tightening of monetary policy with an
unchanged fiscal stance.

It may signal increased eventual future moneti

zation, higher expected future taxes, lower expected future spending, or
a greater probability of debt-repudi ation.
the above.

It may also signal none of

To determine the significance of the behavior of public debt

and deficits, we must get away from the dangerous shortcuts of "model-free "
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single-figure indices of fiscal stance.

The way to deal with a complex

issue is not by pretending that it's really quite simple.

The fiscal

and fina~cial policy choices that co-determine the behavior of public
debt and deficits are too serious a matter for them to be left either to
fiscal quacks or to purveyors of conventional wisdom.

- 99 -

Footnotes

* I would like to thank David Begg, Charles Wyplosz, and Charles Bean
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. My two discussants at the
Paris panel meeting of Economic Policy, Patrick Minford and Torsten
Persson, made many useful suggestions. Some throwaway remarks by Alan
Walters at a conference in September 1984 prompted the discussion of
negative multipliers in Section 5.
1/ The theme of this paper, its structure and many of the ideas
contained in it, were taken from Blanchard, Buiter, and Dornbusch [1985].
The manner in which the present paper follows and extends the ideas of the
earlier paper would be even more apparent, if the original V'ersion of
Blanchard, Buiter, and Dornbusch [1985] were in the public domain. The
published version of that paper, however, does not contain the discussion
of sovereign debt repudiation that motivated the di$cussion of that tssue
in thi.s paper.
2/ See e.g., Webb [1980], Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], Grossman and Hart
[1983], Williamson [1984], Greenwald and Stiglitz [19841, and Laffont
[1985].
'3/ See e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz [1981a, b], Sachs [1984], Sachs and
Cooper [ 1984] , and Ghosh [1985] •

f!.I This assumes that the tax cut is not specifically targeted to invest
ment, e.g., accelerated depi-eciation or an investment subsidy. See
Section 5 for a further discussion of this point.
5/ The debt figures measure public debt at nominal (roughly "par")
values rather than at 1,11arket values. tf data on 'Dlarket values (security
prices and quantities) were available, the change in the debt-output
ratio could be decomposed into four .terms as follows:

pB is the money price of government securities, B their quantity. Many
different kinds of securities can be incorporated without any conceptual
problems.
6/ See Buiter [1983], for a discussion of the relative merits of using
short rather than long, and ex-ante rather than ex-post real interest
rate measures for these calculations. The Bank of England's approach
subtracts from the conventional PSBR the rate of inflation times the
nominal value of the debt. A correction for foreign currency-denomi nated
debt is also made.
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2f "Debt" here and in what follows means interest-bearin g debt.
term "bonds" will be used interchangeably .
§1

2f

A•

The

over a variable denotes its instantaneous rate of change, e.g.,

.
M =(d/dt)M.

Reserves are, for simplicity, treated as non-interest bearing.

10/ Models such as Sidrauski' s [ 1967] with infinite-lived households
chTracterized by a constant pure rate of time preference show no long-run
effect of anticipated money growth or inflation on the real interest
rate. Money-capital models in the spirit of Tobin [1965] have a negative
long-run effect of higher inflation on the marginal product of capital
and thus on the real interest rate, as portfolio holders switchfrom
money to real capital in response to a higher rate of inflation. J.
Carmichael and p.w. Stebbing [1983] found that the data supported a nega...
ti.ve relationshi,p between the real,. rate of interest and the rate of
inflation. The proposition that the nominal interest rate was invariant
under the rate of inflation could not be rejected. See also the papers
collected in Tanzi [ 1984].

11./

Equation ( 5) assumed implicitly that Etdt = dt and that
Et(:M( t) /P( t)) =

M( t)/P( t).

12/ Earlier estimates of the inflation semi-elasticity of base money
de;nd yielded a value of around -2.0. The seigniorage-max imizing infla
tion rate would be 50 percent per year in that case.
V
c»

In general, pL( t) = cEt

Je

-1 fS(u)du
t

dv

t
V

T

T -1 iS(u)du
-J iS(u)du
In general, pB( t) = cEt J e t
dv + pB(T)Ete t
t

15/

dpB(t)
dis

=

With a positive nominal interest rate and a positive time remaining to
maturity, both terms on the right-hand-side of this equation are always
negative.
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16/ If a government could borrow abroad by issuing debt denominated in
itsown currency, the foreign exchange value of debt and debt service
would vary proportionally and inversely with the exchange rate. Debtor
governments that are foreign exchange-constr ained might therefore be
tempted to use devaluation as a means of improving their foreign exchange
positions both in stock and in flow terms. This may be one reason why
most major debtor countries have their debts denominated in foreign
currency, mainly U.S. dollars. It will be interesting to see for how
long the U.S. government will continue to be able to borrow abroad through
dollar-denomina ted debt issues, if the United States continues along the
road that took it from being a major net foreign investor to a zero net
external asset position early in 1985, and to a future that could make it
the largest external borrower within a couple of years.

l]_/ The correction for index-linked debt (introduced in 1981) would
not yet be numerically significant as the following table shows:
The Importance o.f Index-Li~ed Debt in the Uniteci Kingdom

Total national debt
(£ million)*

Year

Index-linked
treasury stock
(£ million)

Share of index-linked
treasury stock in
total national debt

(I)

(2)

(3)

1981

113,037

1,000

0.9

1982

118,390

3,701

3.1

1983

127,730

5,984

4.7

1984

142,545

7,665

5.4

Source:
Note:

.!.§_I

Financial Statistics, various June issues.

*

Nominal amount outstanding at 31st March •

I am indebted to Patrick Minford for this point.

19/ If velocity increases with inflation, the inflation cost of an
increased debt-output ratio is higher since
v(r 8 -n)
> v(r 8 -n) > 0
1-pmav

aµ

if
rS

>

n;

av

aii >

O; and

1

>
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20/ A cut in exhaustive public spending of one-fifth of one percent of
GNP would of course also do the trick.
z

W

I.e., PV (cG, t, rs)

-! rs( u)du
Et J cG(z)e t
dz

=

"°

t

22/ Note that we could subtract the real value of the outstanding stock
ofhigh-powered money M(t)/p(t) as another liability on the right-hand-side
of (13).

We preserve the identity by adding M(t)/p(t) to PV(M/P, t, rs).

This gives us

~~~~·

+ PV(t, t, rs)

= PV(i5i, t, rS), as the "gross"

monetary asset of the authorities. It is the present value of the returns
earned by the central bank through the investment of ... cs entire expected
portfolio at each future date in interest-bearin g assets.

U: t)

23/

_ lim Et [M(z) + BS(z) + pL(z)BL(z)
p(z)
z+GO
z

-J rS(u)du
PK(z)~(z) - Plz)NG(z)]e t
24/
-·-,

'

n:t) = 0 can be rewritten as:
lim Et[M(z) + BS(z) + pL(z)BL(z)
z+c0

J)_/

p(z)Y(z)

I.e., (14) could be written as:
Bs(t) + pL(t)B1 (t) - p(t)[pK(t)~(t) + pN(t)NG(t)]
PV(P(T- cG+ (PK- l)K), t, is)+ PV(M, t, is)

]:i_/

It is assumed for simplicity that rs and n are constants.

27/

I am indebted to Stanley Fischer for this point.
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V

28/

-

R( t)

-

[Et

f

~

e

-! [rs(u) - n(u)]du
t
dv]

-1

t

];J_/ "Residual" debause it omits certain taxes and transfers whose
capitalized value was included in Hills' balance sheet.
30/

Annuitized at R =

o. 02.

-

31/ General government interest payments. Source:
~tlook, April 1984, p. 106.
z
o,
-J rs(u)du
_
1
32/ I.e., R(t)
[Et J e t
dz]

-

IMF W.orld Economic

t

I}J See Eaton and Gersovitz [ 1981a, 1981b], Sachs [1984], Sachs and
Cooper [ 1984 J, and Ghosh [ 1985].
34/ An interesting and as yet open question is under what conditions a
policy of "hone.st" debt service is time-consistent , i.e., compatible with
a sequence of rational moves when pre-commitment is impossible.

-

c. P.

3.5/

See

36/

See Diamond [ 1965] ; Barro [ 197 4] and Buiter [ 1980].

Kindleberger [ 1984].

T!J See Yaari [ 1965] ; Blanchard [ 1985 J ; Frenkel and Razin [ 1984] , and
Buiter [ 1984].
]!/ Since it is the after-tax interest rate that represents the
opportunity cost of holding money, a cut in the tax rate applied to
interest income would boost the demand for money and shift LM to the
left, i.e., be contractionary as regards its effect on the financial
markets.
1J_/ Feldstein [1984] reaches a similar conclusion via a quite different
route involving general price level effects in a two-sector model.
dY
dT
The denominator is assumed to be negative.
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!::lf 62 > 1 means that some taxes are raised (transfer payments are
lowered) when debt service increases, by more than the increase in debt
service, not that the marginal tax rate on interest income is more than
100 percent.
42/

With 62 = 0,
H B
dY
l + ~ + l(r + HBB ~
= __
d e0
61
Pe
p
el
d 60
1
M
dY
d 60

=

B

H6 B
0

1

- 6i + p e1

+

l(HMB~

p 7ii° d 60

If the model is stable, dB/d 60 < 0, and dM/d 60 < o. Since
and HM < O, the long-run effect of bond-financed tax cuts on
the IS-LM equilibrium level of output is greater than that of money

r + RB

>0

financed tax cuts.

43/ Consider the IS-lM model with a fixed level of output Y =Yanda
perfectly flexible price level. The tax function is characterized by
0 < 61 == 62 < 1. The IS-LM solution for r and p are:
r = H(M, B, 60, 61, G)

HM

< O·,

HB

p ,.. J(M, B, 00, el, G)

JM

> O;

JB

> o.
<
> o.

Under bond-financed deficits the stability condition is :
rB
[r + HBB] - ---JB
p

<0

44/ The degree of confidence with which these expectations are held
canonly be built in if one is willing to model conditional second moments.
45/

let

e be

the long-run equilibrium nominal exchange rate, then
ao

e(t)

=

eEt exp(-f [r(u) - r*(u)] du)
t

46/

If c is the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate then:

c( t)

=

cEt exp(j [r(u)
t

~

p(u)) - (r*(u) - p*(u)]du)

p(u)

PK(u)
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!:2/

The short-run efect ov an increase in o or r is given by:
dr

=

d6

(1-Cl)( O-lw) - llCw+Cii.t)
(1-Cy)lr

IS-LM
48/

In the long run:
do
dG

do
dJJ

49/

=

=

(Cy-l)lr
Q

1 r ( I'-CyV/
~
,Q

I assume 1--HR + 1WR

> O;

and

50/ We assume in terms of the notation of footnote
........

48, that n

> O•

51/ This is the case analyzed by Blanchard [1985] and Buiter [1984].
Notraded-no ntraded goods distinction is made.

52/
model.

A is the (constant) instantaneou s probability of death in Blanchard's

53/ See Tanzi [1985] for a discussion of the internation al consequence s
ofLUS] fiscal deficits.
54/ The actual question addressed in these two papers concerned the
stability of the debt process (or the debt-capita l process) when the tax
function takes the form T = T(Y + rB); 0 < T' < 1. The fiscal shock
considered was an increase in G (or in G + rB), but this doesn't affect
the argument.
E_/

I.e., the first-round effects before the demand multiplier has had

time to go to work.
in (43a).

This would be measured by dyrl in (42a) and dyK•-1
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